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LABOR VISCERALITY? WORK STOPPAGES IN THE “NEW 
WORK” NON-UNION ECONOMY 
MICHAEL C. DUFF* 
ABSTRACT 
COVID-19 work stoppages involving employees refusing to work because 
they are fearful of contracting coronavirus provide a recent dramatic 
opportunity for newer workplace law observers to grasp a well-established legal 
rule: both unionized and non-union employees possess rights to engage in work 
stoppages under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”). This article 
explains that employees engaging in concerted work stoppages, in good faith 
reaction to health and safety dangers, are prima facie protected from discharge. 
The article carefully distinguishes between NLRA § 7 and § 502 work stoppages. 
Crucially, and contrary to § 502 work stoppages, the health and safety-related 
work stoppages of non-union employees protected by NLRA § 7 are not subject 
to an “objective reasonableness” test. 
Having analyzed the general legal protection of non-union work stoppages 
and noting that work stoppages had already been on the rise during the 
preceding two years, the article considers when legal protection may be 
withdrawn from work stoppages because employees repeatedly and 
unpredictably engage in them—so called “unprotected intermittent strikes.” 
Discussing a recent National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) decision that 
could be misinterpreted, the article argues for an updated and strengthened 
presumption of work stoppage protection for employees wholly unaffiliated with 
a union who engage in repeated work stoppages that are arguably 
“intermittent.” The law should presume that the work stoppages of unorganized 
employees are not part of an illegitimate plan to drive an employer “into a state 
of confusion.” 
Next, the article grapples with looming work stoppage issues emerging from 
expansion of the Gig economy. When workers are not “employees,” peaceful 
work stoppages may increasingly become subject to federal court injunctions. 
The Norris-LaGuardia Act (the venerable 1932 federal anti-injunction law) does 
not by its terms apply to non-employees—possibly including putative non-
 
* Winston S. Howard Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Wyoming College of Law. 
My Thanks to Professors Jeffrey Hirsch and Michael Oswalt for commenting on earlier drafts of 
the article. All errors are mine. 
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employee Gig workers—raising the specter of a new era of “Government by 
Injunction.” Under existing antitrust law, non-employee workers may be viewed 
as “independent businesspeople” colluding through work stoppages to “fix 
prices.” The article argues that First Amendment avoidance principles should 
guide Sherman Act interpretation when “non-employee” worker activity does 
not resemble price fixing; that, consistent with liability principles articulated in 
the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Sessions v. Dimaya, antitrust law’s 
severe penalties should not be applied to Gig workers given the ambiguities in 
federal and state law employee definitions. 
Finally, the article considers the potential for individual non-union private 
arbitration agreements to curtail the NLRA rights of employees to engage in 
work stoppages in light of the Supreme Court’s labor law-diminishing opinion 
in Epic Systems. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
This article is about work stoppages, events at the fulcrum of American labor 
relations policy. A conception of “labor relations” that imagines a perpetual 
street-chess-match between “labor” and “management” in which two “eternal” 
antagonists1 are rationally planning their next moves leaves much to be desired.2 
A better understanding of labor relations is that of a never-ending, visceral 
encounter between people of very different social and economic stations and 
statuses periodically—often in times of broader social crisis—hurling 
themselves against each other to the point of exhaustion.3 The ensuing stasis 
produced by the exhaustion demarks the temporary boundaries of the law. 
Justificatory rules emerge later. COVID-19 disease may be this generation’s 
“labor” crisis because many workers have resisted working during a pandemic.4 
It is, of course, tidy when labor antagonists conform themselves to facially 
elegant rules. It is also unusual. For, rules or no rules, lawful or unlawful, when 
workers get mad enough (or scared enough) about their working conditions, they 
may simply stop working; if they are ordered to wade into a pandemic, they may 
simply refuse.5 What else but to engage in work stoppages or to engage in mass 
picketing can they do?6 But especially if not represented by a union, these 
workers may not know (and temporarily, as a result of inflamed passions, may 
not care to know) the legal risks entailed in particular courses of action. Indeed, 
given the rapidly transforming legal terrain of the “new economy,” the “old 
economy” law governing labor disputes may be very difficult to apply, exposing 
 
 1. See generally Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077, 167 (Mass. 1896) (Holmes, J., 
dissenting) (noting an eternal conflict between man, who desires to get the most he can for his 
service, and society, which desires to get the services for the least possible expense). 
 2. See Orley Ashenfelter & George E. Johnson, Bargaining Theory, Trade Unions, and 
Industrial Strike Activity, 
59 AM. ECON. REV. 35, 36 (1969) (noting a “presumption in some of the literature that a breakdown 
of negotiations cannot occur if the two parties are ‘rational’”). 
 3. Vegelahn, 44 N.E. at 1081–82. 
 4. Aaron Gordon, Lauren Kaori Gurley, Edward Ongweso Jr, and Jordan Pearson, 
Coronavirus Is a Labor Crisis, and a General Strike Might Be Next, VICE (Apr. 2, 2020), 
https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/z3b9ny/coronavirus-general-strike [https://perma.cc/73MD-
SEFC]. 
 5. Mike Elk, Defying Trump’s Order, Nebraska Meatpackers Strike – PA National Guard 
Replaces Striking Nurses – Richmond Threatens to Fire Striking Bus Drivers, PAYDAY REPORT 
(Apr. 28, 2020), https://paydayreport.com/defying-trumps-order-nebraska-meatpackers-strike-pa-
national-guard-replaces-striking-nurses-richmond-threatens-to-fire-striking-nurses/ [https://perma. 
cc/U6XK-G73S]. 
 6. As Ahmed White has argued, it is easy to see the suppression of such tactics as “labor’s 
undoing.” Ahmed A. White, Workers Disarmed: The Campaign Against Mass Picketing and the 
Dilemma of Liberal Labor Rights, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 59, 63 (2014). While it is true 
employees could “quit employment,” the option is hardly compelling, particularly where working 
conditions are universally bad. 
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labor activists to enhanced risks of job loss or legal liability.7 The old economy 
work-stoppage8 rules were difficult enough even when workers who were 
unambiguously “employees”—unionized employees at that—were engaged in 
“classical” labor disputes.9 
Once upon a time, for example, when this writer was a much younger man, 
he found himself suddenly in the midst of a “wildcat strike”10 in Philadelphia. 
A union-activist co-worker had been fired on the job on—many were 
convinced—trumped-up charges. In response to the firing, about four hundred 
Teamster-represented airline fleet service agents walked off the job, leaving 
many jet aircraft and passengers stranded at their gates. It was a dramatic scene. 
This writer had been a union shop steward for just a few weeks and will never 
forget how rapidly the scene unfolded, how little he knew about the “rules of the 
game” in such situations, and how much even a little more knowledge could 
have helped him. The work stoppage violated a no-strike pledge in the collective 
bargaining agreement governing the workplace and was likely illegal,11 though 
few employees lost their jobs.12 
When union stewards are nonplussed by the potentially unplanned and sheer 
animal energy of a work stoppage, the possible confusion becomes evident for 
relatively unsophisticated non-union employees, especially those in which the 
 
 7. As will be developed, infra, the “old economy” is one that consisted of workers acting 
concertedly as “employees” who were not bound by arbitration agreements and who were much 
more likely than at present to be represented by unions. 
 8. A work-stoppage, when initiated by employees, is a strike. See Work Stoppages, U.S. 
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, https://www.bls.gov/wsp/questions-and-answers.htm#Ques 
tion_5 [https://perma.cc/3HUV-29ZV] (last visited Aug. 19, 2020). 
 9. The right to strike is protected activity under §§ 7 and 13 of the National Labor Relations 
Act but the “lawfulness of a strike may depend on the object, or purpose, of the strike, on its timing, 
or on the conduct of the strikers.” See The Right to Strike, NAT’L LAB. RELS. BD., https://www.nl 
rb.gov/strikes [https://perma.cc/KE72-4ED2] (last visited Aug. 15, 2020). 
 10. A wildcat strike is a “work stoppage undertaken by employees without the consent of their 
respective unions. Such strikes are not necessarily illegal, but they often violate terms of a collective 
bargaining agreement. The name is based on the stereotypical characteristics associated with 
wildcats: unpredictability and uncontrollability.” See ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britanni 
ca.com/topic/wildcat-strike [https://perma.cc/W9UM-3X3H] (last visited Aug. 15, 2020). As an 
aside, this 80s-era strike may have foreshadowed changing structural dynamics in an emerging 
precarious work economy: the fired and striking employees were in the lower-tier of a two-tier 
wage structure, earning roughly ten dollars per hour less than their upper-tier co-workers. The strike 
was unwise from a legal perspective, but perhaps inevitable. 
 11. See Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960). 
 12. See, e.g., Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 414 U.S. 368, 385 
(1974); Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235, 247–48 (1970) (discussing unprotected 
strikes in context of no-strike pledges in collective bargaining agreements). The intense solidarity 
of the local union members at the center of the drama—Local 732, International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters (Airline Division)—made even legally permissible discharges difficult because of the 
real risk of generating additional work stoppages. 
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employee status of workers is not clear.13 Union stewards know about the 
general right of employees to strike and may even have vague intuitions about 
legal qualifications of that right; certainly, they will know that workers are 
statutory employees with collective bargaining rights.14 One doubts the same 
knowledge or intuitions are held by workers in a wide variety of non-union 
workplaces in which, among other factors, employee status is unclear given the 
hazy outlines of the “Gig economy.”15 Contemporary commentators observe 
that “workers involved in today’s labor struggles, are outlining the blueprint of 
a new labor law—a labor law that moves away from narrow, bureaucratic, and 
legalistic forms of worker representation toward more sectoral, worker-driven, 
and political forms of organization.”16 Implicit in this observation, in the very 
idea of a labor “struggle,” is an understanding that new “sectoral, worker-driven, 
and political forms of organization” will be fiercely resisted by employers or 
others who use labor.17 Most recently, a wide variety of COVID-19-related 
workplace disputes have highlighted the need for a better understanding of the 
complicated legal terrain upon which the new economy is built. A terrain that 
includes gig workers and the expansion of compulsory arbitration of workplace 
disputes in non-union workplaces.18 
In all workplaces, if history is a guide, work stoppages starkly and abruptly 
coalesce employee grievances and expedite employers’ attention to them.19 
International law implicitly recognizes work stoppages as a logical outgrowth of 
the freedom of association of workers.20 Along similar lines, commentators 
 
 13. See generally infra Part II. 
 14. See NLRB. v. City Disposals Systems, Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 844 (1984) (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting) (discussing relative sophistication of union shop stewards on labor law matters in the 
workplace when compared to rank-and-file workers). 
 15. See discussion infra Part 0. 
 16. Kate Andrias, Peril and Possibility: Strikes, Rights, and Legal Change in the Age of 
Trump, 40 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 135, 148 (2019) (hereinafter “Peril and Possibility”). 
 17. Beginning in about the last two decades of the twentieth century it has become clear that 
employer resistance to labor organization has increased with innovations in the American economy 
and increased product competition. Henry S. Farber, The Decline of Unionization in the United 
States: What Can Be Learned from Recent Experience?, 8 J. LAB. ECON. S75, S76 (1990). 
 18. Robert Combs, Analysis: COVID-19 Has Workers Striking. Where Are the Unions?, 
BLOOMBERG LAW (Apr. 14, 2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-law-analysis/anal 
ysis-COVID-19-has-workers-striking-where-are-the-unions [https://perma.cc/DBN3-YNVP]. 
 19. See Strike, NEW WORLD ENCYC. (Jan. 4, 2020), https://www.newworldencyclopedia 
.org/entry/Strike. 
 20. The view is not without detractors. For arguments that the right exists, see Bernard 
Gernigon, Alberto Odero, and Horacio Guido, ILO Principles Concerning the Right To Strike, 
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION (1998), https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-
ed_norm/—-normes/documents/publication/wcms_087987.pdf [https://perma.cc/94EQ-A4LW]. 
See also Janice R. Bellace, The ILO and the Right to Strike, 153 INT’L LAB. REV. 29, 47–48 (2014) 
(tracing the distillation of the right to strike under international law to the distillation of the right 
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question whether federal labor law would ever have emerged without a 
continuous, credible threat by workers of widespread interruptions of 
production.21 Whether labor insurgency, especially in the form of work 
stoppages, represents reflexive viscerality, romantic folly, or a constructive road 
to freedom,22 it is what workers have done throughout history in reaction to 
adverse working conditions.23 In recent times, even before COVID-19 events, 
the Economic Policy Institute reported that workers in the United States were 
increasingly engaging in strike activity:  
Data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) show that there was an upsurge 
in major strike activity in 2018 and 2019, marking a 35-year high for the number 
of workers involved in a major work stoppage over a two-year period. Further, 
2019 recorded the greatest number of work stoppages involving 20,000 or more 
workers since at least 1993, when the BLS started providing data that made it 
possible to track work stoppages by size.24  
Work stoppages may take new forms in the present technological era. If 
work is assigned by way of electronic “app,” for example, workers may refuse 
the assignment or may feign compliance with it. Workers may also utilize 
technology to engage in concerted protests short of work stoppages. As 
Professor Jeffrey Hirsch has noted, “[w]idespread Internet availability in the 
workplace has provided unions with an important tool—which they have 
actively used—to organize and communicate with employees, especially those 
 
from the United Nations Right of Freedom of Association under the Freedom of Association 
Convention No. 87). 
 21. Professor Alan Hyde has written that “the transformative labor reforms with which we 
deal were indeed payoffs to insurgent working classes, though the word ‘payoff’ is not the one I 
would normally use. Moreover, the payoffs were not necessarily guided by notions of efficiency or 
the public good.” Alan Hyde, A Theory of Labor Legislation, 38 BUFF. L. REV. 383, 429 (1990); 
see also Ashenfelter and Johnson, supra note 2, at 35 (“Most union ‘power’ is derived from the 
threat of [the] strike . . .”). 
 22. See James G. Pope, Labor’s Constitution of Freedom, 106 YALE L. J. 941, 942 (1997) 
(discussing the right to strike as an essential part of labor’s conception of its own liberty). 
 23. JEREMY BRECHER, STRIKE! 12 (1972). 
 24. Heidi Shierholz and Margaret Poydock, Continued Surge in Strike Activity Signals Worker 
Dissatisfaction with Wage Growth, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Feb. 11, 2020), https://www.epi.org/publi 
cation/continued-surge-in-strike-activity/ [https://perma.cc/85Y9-5E5T]. “BLS data on major work 
stoppages–work stoppages involving 1,000 or more workers lasting one shift or longer—show that 
425,500 workers were involved in major work stoppages that began in 2019.” Id. A breakdown of 
2019 work stoppages and employers involved includes North Carolina public school teachers 
(92,700); General Motors automotive workers (46,000); West Virginia public school teachers 
(36,400); Los Angeles public school teachers (33,000); Chicago public school teachers (32,000); 
Stop & Shop workers (31,000); University of California service and medical center workers 
(25,000); Kentucky public school teachers (22,900); Oregon public school teachers (20,400); 
AT&T workers (20,000). Id. 
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who are difficult to reach through traditional means.”25 Even as technology is 
driving changes in labor organizing, protest, or other exercises of concerted 
activities,26 work stoppages are where the “rubber hits the road” when agreement 
between workers and employers or other labor users over important working 
conditions cannot be achieved, as COVID-19 events have reemphasized.27 
As workers increasingly engage in work stoppages, the question arises as to 
what legal constructs will await them given new modes of industrial 
organization in the economy. Assessing this new employment landscape, one 
might first want to know how employers will preliminarily react to work 
stoppages. It has been somewhat surprising, for example, when public sector 
school teachers, engaging in often unlawful strikes over the last few years, have 
not been uniformly fired, as they legally might have been.28 Perhaps this resulted 
from a high degree of community support for the teachers in some states.29 Or 
perhaps public employers were simply “rusty” at deploying the “economic 
weapons” the law has historically afforded them.30 Leaving to one side 
 
 25. Jeffrey M. Hirsch, The Silicon Bullet: Will the Internet Kill the NLRA, 76 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 262, 274 (2008). 
 26. Id. at 274-75. 
 27. Joshua Freeman, Pandemics Can Mean Strike Waves, JACOBIN (Apr. 7, 2020), 
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2020/04/coronavirus-pandemic-strike-wave-spanish-flu [https://per 
ma.cc/T872-CFK5] (pointing out that during the Spanish Flu pandemic in 1919, four million 
workers struck, which at the time represented one-fifth of the workforce). 
 28. See Andrias, supra note 16, at 141-144. Teacher strikes are illegal in most states. Milla 
Sanes and John Schmitt, Regulation of Public Sector Collective Bargaining in the States, CTR. 
ECON. AND POL’Y RSCH., Chart 3, at 8 (2014), https://cepr.net/documents/state-public-cb-2014-
03.pdf [https://perma.cc/2WC9-KBZG]. 
 29. In West Virginia, for example, “students walked picket lines with teachers, and 
superintendents in all 55 counties closed schools every day for seven days in support of the teachers. 
This prevented the walkouts from turning into an actual strike, which would have been illegal for 
teachers to perform in West Virginia.” Kate Cimini, Teacher Strikes are Illegal in West Virginia 
. . . So How Did They Strike?, MEDILL NEWS SERV. (Mar. 8, 2018), https://dc.medill.north 
western.edu/blog/2018/03/08/67017/#sthash.9CKm29hN.dpbs [https://perma.cc/29US-JJ2U] (last 
visited Aug. 21, 2020). 
 30. Other examples of this phenomenon exist. Many readers will be familiar with strikes by 
New York metro workers in apparent violation of the Taylor Law that did not result in employee 
discharges. See Nicole Gelinas, Putting Teeth in the Taylor Law, CITY J. (Dec. 14, 2005), 
https://www.city-journal.org/html/putting-teeth-taylor-law-10137.html [https://perma.cc/MLE5-A 
MAV]. The development nevertheless seemed surprising because of some of the conservative states 
in which strikes were occurring like Oklahoma, West Virginia, Kentucky, and Arizona. See Eric 
Levitz, The Teachers’ Strikes Have Exposed the GOP’s Achilles Heel, INTELLIGENCER (April 5, 
2018), https://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/04/the-teachers-strikes-have-exposed-the-gops-achil 
les-heel.html [https://perma.cc/68YQ-VVU6]. There has been some indication that state 
legislatures were attempting to “tighten up” state anti-strike laws in the summer of 2019 in the wake 
of successful strikes. See Jake Wartel, States Push Anti-Protest Bills In Response to Teachers’ 
Strikes, DEFENDING RTS. & DISSENT (Jun. 13, 2019), https://rightsanddissent.org/news/states-push 
-anti-protest-bills-in-response-to-teachers-strikes/ [https://perma.cc/Y2NN-SH5K]. 
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employers’ preliminary, spontaneous responses to work stoppages, legal 
analysis of work stoppages must confront systemic, “new economy” legal 
complexities and reconsider the de facto legal status quo. 
Three such especially pressing complexities surrounding work stoppages in 
the “new work” economy warrant extended discussion, for they suggest new 
arguments problematizing the lawfulness of work stoppages. Merely 
questioning the rights of workers to engage in work stoppages may have a 
chilling effect on worker organization, especially among the most fearful and 
precarious workers. 
First, although non-union employees have long possessed the right to 
engage in work stoppages under the NLRA 31 a principle relevant to recent non-
union, safety-related COVID-19 work stoppages and to the Google Walkout of 
2018,32 the NLRB arguably expanded a rule forbidding “intermittent strikes,” 
which could more easily render non-union work stoppages unprotected under 
the NLRA.33 Under the rule, non-union employees possess the right to engage 
in work stoppages, but multiple work stoppages may at a certain point become 
unprotected if part of a “plan” is to drive an employer into a “state of 
confusion.”34 The lines drawn by the NLRB are fine, and the potential for 
confusion is high over this slippery doctrine, especially among unsophisticated 
workers. This article will contend that “intermittency doctrine” should be 
sparingly applied to non-union employees.35 As the COVID-19 work stoppages 
have demonstrated, panic by workers over repeated risk of exposure to 
dangerous disease is not part of a “plan,” and reactive work stoppages of this 
type should never be denied NLRA protection under an intermittency theory 
when the employees involved are not members of a union. 
 
 31. 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (2018); see NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 12–
13 (1962); see also 29 U.S.C. § 163 (2018). It is also true, however, that in a number of contexts 
“[l]abor picketing, labor boycotts, and union associational activity are all routinely curbed by the 
state.” Laura Weinrib, The Right to Work and the Right to Strike, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 513, 533 
(2018), https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclf/vol2017/iss1/20 [https://perma.cc/EP7A-29Z2]. 
 32. See Johana Bhuiyan, The Google Walkout: What protesters Demanded and What They 
Got, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/story/2019-11-
06/google-walkout-demands [https://perma.cc/YRX3-E378] (“On Nov. 1, 2018, some 20,000 
Google employees walked off the job in protest of the company’s handling of sexual harassment 
allegations.”). 
 33. Walmart Stores, Inc., 368 N.L.R.B No. 24 (July 25, 2019). Walmart will be discussed infra 
Section II.C. The qualifier “may have” refers to an odd situation in which critical facts were 
stipulated in a manner calling into question the rule that was actually established. Nevertheless, 
employers may be under the impression that “intermittent strike doctrine” firmly applies in the 
context of non-union workplaces, a proposition with which the article will contend. 
 34. See infra. at Part II. 
 35. Id. 
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A second legal complexity centers on the national legal uncertainty and 
volatility over which workers qualify as “employees.”36 The employee 
definition is crucially important for labor law because only employees are 
protected by the NLRA37 and only employees explicitly possess the right to 
engage in work stoppages.38 Additionally, federal courts are normally prevented 
from issuing injunctions to suspend work stoppages in peaceful, private-sector 
labor disputes involving employees.39 If only employee work stoppages are 
protected from federal court injunctions,40 even peaceful strikes and picketing 
by non-employee workers—such as independent contractors or other types of 
Gig economy workers—could be lawfully enjoined at the federal level. 41 This 
development could open the possibility of a new era of “Government by 
injunction” in which federal injunctions effectively quash nascent worker 
organizing.42 
Conjoined to renewed potential for federal courts quashing peaceful work 
stoppages over working conditions is the issue of whether non-employee 
workers could be subject to antitrust liability for engaging in work stoppages.43 
The question takes on heightened importance as increasing numbers of workers 
in the Gig economy are classified by companies as independent contractors.44 
 
 36. Mitchell H. Rubinstein, Employees, Employers, and Quasi-Employers: An Analysis of 
Employees and Employers Who Operate In the Borderland Between an Employer and Employee 
Relationship, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 605, 608 (2012) (observing that legal definition of “employee” 
is unclear and arguing that the “lack of clarity is largely due to the fact that the statutory language 
defining employee status in virtually all of our nation’s employment laws is vague, conclusory, and 
largely useless.”) 
 37. 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(3), 157 (2018); Kerry Rittich, Between Workers’ Rights and Flexibility: 
Labor Law in an Uncertain World, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L. J. 565, 572 (2010) (“Contractualized work 
relations, for example, mean that many workers engaged in precarious and contingent work are 
legally designated as independent contractors and have no entitlement to bargain collectively.”). 
 38. 29 U.S.C. §§ 152(3), 157, 163 (2018). 
 39. United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 231 (1941). 
 40. 29 U.S.C. § 113(a) (2018); see discussion infra Part III.B. 
 41. Taylor v. Local No. 7, Int’l Union of Journeymen Horseshoers of U.S. and Can. (AFL-
CIO), 353 F.2d 593, 606 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 969 (1966). 
 42. For the classic discussion of the role of labor injunctions in early 20th century labor 
disputes, see generally FELIX FRANKFURTER AND NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 
(1930). 
 43. Antitrust jurisdiction is one of the better historical examples of when federal courts have 
been in a position to enjoin peaceful work stoppages. See infra Part III. B. 
 44. Yuki Noguchi, Freelanced: The Rise of the Contract Workforce, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 
22, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/01/22/578825135/rise-of-the-contract-workers-work-is-dif 
ferent-now [https://perma.cc/LVQ4-HGJT] (“NPR/Marist poll finds that 1 in 5 jobs in America is 
held by a worker under contract.”). There is some dispute as to the actual number of independent 
contractors given reporting by the Bureau of Labor Statistics suggesting that independent 
contractors made up only 6.9% of the workforce as of 2017. Independent Contractors Made Up 
6.9 Percent of Employment in May 2017, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/ 
2018/independent-contractors-made-up-6-point-9-percent-of-employment-in-may-2017.htm 
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Early in the twentieth century, labor activity conducted through unions was often 
deemed by courts “a conspiracy in restraint of trade,” in violation of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act.45 Through long historical development, labor activity was 
substantially “exempted” from antitrust law.46 The question now is whether 
widespread use of independent contractors in place of “employees” will 
reanimate the sorts of antitrust problems that have been exorcised by labor law.47 
Antitrust violations are subject to federal injunction and carry hefty substantive 
penalties.48 The mere threat of antitrust liability has been shown by scholars to 
deter concerted activity directed at pressuring companies to improve the working 
conditions of their non-employee workers.49 
 
[https://perma.cc/JBR3-M8R2] (last visited Aug. 23, 2020). This figure is questionable for a 
number of reasons, not the least of which is that a large portion of the “Gig” economy is simply not 
included. Alastair Fitzpayne & Shelly Steward, Nine Things to Know Before the 2017 Contingent 
Worker Supplement is Released, ASPEN INST. (Jun. 6, 2018), https://www.aspeninstitute.org/blog-
posts/nine-things-to-know-before-2017-cws-release/ [https://perma.cc/JE4G-2GCP]. The central 
premise of the Gig economy is that workers are not employees, and it is the “not-employee” 
character of the workers that carries the potential for invocation of antitrust law. 
 45. Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 471–72 (1921) (holding that even 
peaceful labor disputes involving “secondary” labor pressure were not “proximately and 
substantially concerned . . . in an actual dispute respecting the terms or conditions of their own 
employment, past, present or prospective” so as to shelter employees from the operation of the 
federal antitrust laws). 
 46.  
Courts have recognized both ‘statutory’ and ‘non-statutory’ labor exemptions to the 
antitrust laws . . . The statutory exemption . . . establishes that labor unions are not 
combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade and exempts certain union activities from 
scrutiny under the antitrust laws . . . However, the statutory exemption does ‘not exempt 
concerted action or agreements between unions and nonlabor parties.’ The non-statutory 
labor exemption . . . has been inferred from federal labor statutes. These ‘set forth a national 
labor policy favoring free and private collective bargaining,’ ‘require good-faith bargaining 
over wages, hours, and working conditions’ and ‘delegate related rulemaking and 
interpretive authority to the National Labor Relations Board.’ 
Cal. ex rel. Harris v. Safeway, Inc., 651 F.3d 1118, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 47. For a very early expression by the U.S. Supreme Court of the principle that independent 
contractors are excluded from labor exemptions from antitrust law, see Columbia River Packers 
Ass’n v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143, 147 (1942). 
 48. For the scope of liability, see Antitrust Guidance For Human Resource Professionals, 
DEP’T JUST.: ANTITRUST DIV. AND FED. TRADE COMM’N (Oct. 2016), https://www.justice.gov 
/atr/file/903511/download [https://perma.cc/4UNH-Y88J]. As Professor Paul has observed, the 
continued interplay of labor and antitrust law seems oddly anachronistic and may be ripe for broad 
challenge. Sanjukta M. Paul, The Enduring Ambiguities of Antitrust Liability for Worker Collective 
Action, 47 LOYOLA CHI. L. J. 969, 1030 (2016). 
 49. Id. at 982 (discussing chilling effect of specter of antitrust on organizing activities of 
drivers in deregulated trucking industry alleged to be independent contractors). 
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Third, workplace arbitration, which is now compulsory for over half the 
private-sector employees in the United States,50 may complicate non-union 
employee work stoppages. Compulsory arbitration is frequently controversial. 
The practice itself was at the heart of the 2018 Google work stoppage: workers 
protested compulsory arbitration of sexual harassment and sexual assault 
cases.51 In the context of work stoppages, however, a more complicated problem 
may arise in the wake of Epic System v. Lewis,52 which has been understood as 
broadly subordinating the NLRA to the Federal Arbitration Act. Although the 
argument would previously have been unthinkable, it is now possible to 
anticipate the claim that the right under the NLRA to engage in non-union 
employee work stoppages is subordinate to an agreement by a non-union, 
individual employee and an employer to waive the right in lieu of individual 
employee arbitration.53 
II.  NON-UNION EMPLOYEE WORK STOPPAGES AND INTERMITTENCY 
This Part discusses non-union employee rights to engage in work stoppages 
and explains how those rights can be adversely impacted. The non-union context 
is important because the overwhelming number of employees in the United 
States are not represented by unions; and it is not widely known that non-union 
employees possess the right to engage in work stoppages under the NLRA, a 
statute that is often erroneously believed to apply only to unionized workplaces 
and employees.54 The analysis of whether work stoppages are protected can 
change depending upon their frequency. This can become a problem for non-
union employees who may have no idea that the timing of a work stoppage may, 
in any respect, impact its protection under federal labor law. 
 
 50. “Among private-sector nonunion employees, 56.2 percent are subject to mandatory 
employment arbitration procedures. Extrapolating to the overall workforce, this means that 60.1 
million American workers no longer have access to the courts to protect their legal employment 
rights and instead must go to arbitration.” Alexander J.S. Colvin, The Growing Use of Mandatory 
Arbitration, ECON. POL’Y INST. (April 6, 2018), https://www.epi.org/publication/the-growing-use-
of-mandatory-arbitration/ [https://perma.cc/G6TE-PDG4]. 
 51. The company apparently agreed to suspend the policy. See Bhuiyan, supra note 32 and 
accompanying text. 
 52. 138 S.Ct. 1612, 1632 (2018). 
 53. See infra Part IV. 
 54. Christine Walters & Patricia Wise, Viewpoint: The ABCs of the NLRA for Nonunion 
Employers, SHRM (July 22, 2016), https://www.shrm.org/resourcesandtools/hr-topics/labor-rela 
tions/pages/viewpoint-abcs-nlra.aspx [https://perma.cc/BW26-DVJZ]. 
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A. Non-Union Employee Work Stoppages Generally 
As noted, non-union employees possess the right to engage in work 
stoppages under American labor law.55 Indeed, the right to engage in work 
stoppages, and other “concerted activities” runs to employees and not directly to 
“labor organizations,” or unions.56 Unions’ rights are ultimately derivative of 
employees’ rights.57 Furthermore, the right of non-union employees to engage 
in such work stoppages is tempered by the countervailing right of employers to 
replace “strikers,” as opposed to discharging them, a counterweight that applies 
equally in union and non-union workplaces.58 
Returning to the Google example, when thousands of non-union Google 
workers walked off the job for one day on November 1, 2018, to protest 
revelations “that Google had paid millions of dollars in exit packages to male 
executives accused of misconduct, while staying silent about the 
transgressions,”59 the work stoppage was first a concerted activity within the 
meaning of § 7 of the NLRA.60 In addition, to enjoy coverage under the NLRA, 
 
 55. See Weinrib, supra note 31. The right to engage in a work stoppage either by union-
represented or non-union employees is not absolute. The right can be curtailed where the objective 
of a work stoppage is illegal, the work stoppage is carried out by tortious or criminal means, or the 
work stoppage contravenes statutory labor policy or specific sections of the NLRA. See Robert F. 
Koretz & Robert J. Rabin, The Development and History of Protected Concerted Activity, 24 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 715, 716-28 (1973). 
 56. National Labor Relations Act, Section 7 states in relevant part, “Employees shall have the 
right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through 
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose 
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2018) (emphasis 
added). 
 57. NLRB v. Jasper Seating Co., 857 F.2d 419, 422 (7th Cir. 1988) (“Nothing in the Act, 
however, limits the rights of nonunionized employees to engage in concerted conduct for their 
mutual aid regardless of whether or not their goal is supported by a majority of employees.”). 
 58. Replacement of strikers may be “permanent” or “temporary.” The distinction between the 
two categories is that a temporarily replaced striker must be reinstated after making an 
unconditional offer to return to work; an employer is not required to reinstate a striker who has 
been permanently replaced until the replacement has left employment with the “struck” employer. 
The same rules apply whether a work stoppage has arisen in a union or a non-union workplace. Tri-
State Wholesale Bldg. Supplies, Inc., 362 N.L.R.B 730, 733-34 (2015) (applying traditional strike 
replacement rules in the context of a non-union work stoppage) enforced, 657 Fed.App’x. 421 (6th 
Cir. 2016). 
 59. Daisuke Wakabayashi, Erin Griffith, Amie Tsang, & Kate Conger, Google Walkout: 
Employees Stage Protest Over Handling of Sexual Harassment, N. Y. TIMES (November 1, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/01/technology/google-walkout-sexual-harassment.html 
[https://perma.cc/HUG9-4PQ7]. 
 60. For the relevant text, see § 7, supra note 56. To enjoy coverage under the National Labor 
Relations Act conduct must be both protected and concerted. Prill v. NLRB. (“Prill II”), 835 F.2d 
1481, 1482-83 (D.C. Cir. 1987); see also Fresh and Easy Neighborhood Market, Inc., 361 N.L.R.B 
151, 152, 154 (2014) (finding concerted a non-union employee’s attempt to enlist her coworkers’ 
assistance in raising a sexual harassment complaint to management, by soliciting three of them to 
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concerted activity must be undertaken for the “mutual aid or protection” of 
employees—in other words, to enjoy “protection,” the activity must have some 
nexus to workers or working conditions.61 In the non-union Google Walkout, 
the protest had a clear nexus to working conditions because the alleged 
transgressions were related to workplace misconduct that adversely impacted 
workers.62 Accordingly, had Google fired the workers for engaging in the work 
stoppage, it might have been required to remit backpay for any lost wages 
incurred thereby and ordered to reinstate the workers.63 Google also might have 
been lawfully entitled to “replace” employees engaging in a work stoppage, an 
option that is usually of little value in a work stoppage of very short duration. 
B. Non-Union Work Stoppages in a Health and Safety Context 
The law of work stoppages in health and safety contexts has become highly 
relevant during the COVID-19 era. A number of factual situations have 
emerged, but of particular interest to the public have been circumstances in 
which nurses or other health care workers refused to work, claiming not to have 
had adequate personal protective equipment.64 Work stoppages have been 
occurring, however, across the occupational landscape.65 Some of the highest 
COVID-19 infection and death rates in the economy have been in the 
meatpacking industry; it has been extraordinarily dangerous work.66 In fact, 
meatpacking work has been so dangerous that the risk of contracting the 
COVID-19 disease has been suggested as a cause of the significant absenteeism 
 
sign the piece of paper on which she had copied the altered whiteboard message in order to “prove” 
the harassment to which she had been subjected). 
 61. See Washington Aluminum, 370 U.S. at 12, 17. 
 62. See Bhuiyan, supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
 63. § 10(c) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 160(c); Trompler, Inc. v. NLRB., 338 F.3d 747, 748, 
755 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 64. Justin Wise, Nurses Union Says Workers Were Suspended for Refusing to Help 
Coronavirus Patients Without N95 Masks, HILL (Apr. 16, 2020) https://thehill.com/policy/health 
care/493095-nurses-union-says-workers-were-suspended-for-refusing-to-help-coronavirus 
[https://perma.cc/5RL2-PQKD]; Madeleine Pauker, Santa Monica Nurses Refuse to Enter Patients’ 
Rooms Without N95 Masks, SANTA MONICA DAILY PRESS (Apr. 13, 2020), https://www.smdp 
.com/santa-monica-nurses-refuse-to-enter-patients-rooms-without-n95-masks/189256 [https://per 
ma.cc/X9U2-Y5DQ]; Janelle Griffith, Nurses are Protesting Working Conditions Under 
Coronavirus—and Say Hospitals Aren’t Protecting Them, NBC NEWS (Apr. 20, 2020), 
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/nurses-are-protesting-working-conditions-under-corona 
virus-say-hospitals-aren-n1181321 [https://perma.cc/A9Z9-X293]. 
 65. See COVID-19 Strike Wave Interactive Map, PAYDAY REPORT, https://paydayreport.com 
/COVID-19-strike-wave-interactive-map/ (last visited Aug. 19, 2020). 
 66. Eric Schlosser, America’s Slaughterhouses Aren’t Just Killing Animals, THE ATLANTIC 
(May 12, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/05/essentials-meatpeacking-co 
ronavirus/611437/ [https://perma.cc/6EFL-9DCA]. 
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suffered by the industry beginning in early-April 2020.67 In an underreported 
part of the absenteeism story, some non-union meatpacking employees simply 
walked off the job in response to safety concerns. For example, in Kathleen, 
Georgia, fifty employees walked off the job in a Perdue chicken facility in 
protest of what they believed were unsafe working conditions. In the words of 
Perdue employee Kendaliyn Granville:  
We’re not getting nothing—no type of compensation, no nothing, not even no 
[sic] cleanliness, no extra pay—no nothing. We’re up here risking our life [sic] 
for chicken . . . All we’re asking now is just to sanitize the building. Sanitize the 
building. Everybody that’s been exposed to it, they need to go home. These folks 
are still on the floor. 68 
Similar events have been unfolding at Amazon warehouses across the 
United States. By the third week of April 2020, hundreds of non-union Amazon 
workers “pledged to stay home from work, according to the worker rights group 
United for Respect, as frustrations mount over protections and support for 
Amazon employees.”69 According to news reports, “[p]rotesting employees say 
they will continue to call in sick until Amazon makes safety-related changes at 
warehouses.”70 Similar reports also disclosed plans for walkouts in New York,71 
Illinois,72 and Michigan.73 In early April, U.S. Senators were “intensifying 
pressure for Amazon to improve working conditions for its warehouse 
employees during the coronavirus pandemic” and questioning “the company’s 
decision to fire an employee who demanded better health protections at the 
 
 67. Dan Charles, Meat Processing Plants Suspend Operations After Workers Fall Ill, NPR 
(Apr. 7, 2020), https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-live-updates/2020/04/07/828873225/ 
meat-processing-plants-suspend-operations-after-workers-fall-ill [https://perma.cc/M8XU-Q23C]. 
 68. Sarah Hammond, ‘This is Not a Playing Matter’: Perdue Plant Employees Walk Out Over 
COVID-19 Concerns, 13WMAZ (Mar. 24, 2020), https://www.13wmaz.com/article/news/local/ 
perdue-employees-walk-out-as-coronavirus-concerns-grow/93-7c7bdcbb-f3ec-439b-b541-9070e 
758b5cb [https://perma.cc/M6J6-A8GH]. 
 69. Kari Paul, Hundreds of Amazon Warehouse Workers to Call in Sick in Coronavirus 
Protest, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/apr/20/ 
amazon-warehouse-workers-sickout-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/5AXV-KLWE]. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Annie Palmer, Amazon Workers Plan Strike at Staten Island Warehouse to Demand 
Coronavirus Protections, CNBC (Mar. 29, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/03/29/amazon-
workers-in-staten-island-plan-strike-over-coronavirus-safety.html [https://perma.cc/ATH8-K923]. 
 72. Caroline O’Donovan, As More Amazon Employees Contract the Coronavirus, Workers 
Are Walking Off The Job, BUZZFEED NEWS (Mar. 31, 2020), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/ 
article/carolineodonovan/amazon-employees-coronavirus-walkout [https://perma.cc/6GSY-EUK 
X]. 
 73. Josh Dzieza, Exclusive: Detroit Amazon Workers Plan to Walk Out Over Handling of 
COVID-19, THE VERGE (Apr. 1, 2020), https://www.theverge.com/2020/4/1/21202745/amazon-co 
ronavirus-walk-out-detroit-protests-warehouse-cleaning. 
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company’s facilities.”74 In response to this activity, Amazon has reportedly 
improved working conditions in a number of ways, but as of May 14, 2020, six 
Amazon workers had apparently died of coronavirus complications, and 
Amazon had still not released data on coronavirus infections.75 In light of these 
events, the continued potential for work stoppages like sickouts or mass 
walkouts seems high. 
At first blush, the law of work stoppages discussed in the preceding section 
would appear to apply uniformly to health and safety connected work stoppages 
because it is a form of concerted activity with a tight connection to working 
conditions,76 and this is substantially a correct assessment. In NLRB v. 
Washington Aluminum Co., for example, still the lead case in this area of law, 
non-union employees engaged in a work stoppage over cold working 
conditions.77 The employer argued that the work stoppage was unprotected 
because the employer had in good faith been attempting to improve working 
conditions.78 The Supreme Court rejected the argument that employees were 
acting unreasonably because they had presented no demand to the employer: 
We cannot agree that employees necessarily lose their right to engage in 
concerted activities under s 7 merely because they do not present a specific 
demand upon their employer to remedy a condition they find objectionable. The 
language of s 7 is broad enough to protect concerted activities whether they take 
place before, after, or at the same time such a demand is made. To compel the 
Board to interpret and apply that language in the restricted fashion suggested by 
the respondent here would only tend to frustrate the policy of the Act to protect 
the right of workers to act together to better their working conditions. Indeed, as 
indicated by this very case, such an interpretation of s 7 might place burdens 
upon employees so great that it would effectively nullify the right to engage in 
concerted activities which that section protects. The seven employees here were 
part of a small group of employees who were wholly unorganized. They had no 
bargaining representative and, in fact, no representative of any kind to present 
their grievances to their employer. Under these circumstances, they had to speak 
for themselves as best they could.79 
Furthermore, and contrary to what is sometimes claimed, there is no 
requirement under controlling labor law precedent that the health and safety-
related concerted work-stoppages of employees must be “objectively 
 
 74. Shirin Ghaffary, Senators Are Demanding Answers from Amazon About How it Treats 
Warehouse Workers, VOX (Apr. 8, 2020), https://www.vox.com/recode/2020/4/8/21214117/ama 
zon-warehouse-workers-coronavirus-senator-booker-chris-smalls-senators-letter. 
 75. Annie Palmer, Sixth Confirmed Amazon Worker Dies Amid Calls for the Company to 
Release Data on Coronavirus Infections, CNBC (May 14, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/ 
14/sixth-confirmed-amazon-worker-dies.html [https://perma.cc/84U2-NLL9]. 
 76. See Wise, supra note 64. 
 77. 370 U.S. at 16. 
 78. Id. at 14. 
 79. Id. 
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reasonable” to enjoy protection under the NLRA. Some confusion in this area 
can arise because of the interplay of §§ 7 and 502 of the NLRA. § 502, a 
provision of the law not under discussion in Washington Aluminum, states in 
relevant part that “the quitting of labor by an employee or employees in good 
faith because of abnormally dangerous conditions for work at the place of 
employment of such employee or employees [shall not] be deemed a strike under 
this Act.”80 The purpose of § 502 is to make clear that workers engaging in a 
work-stoppage because of abnormally dangerous working conditions will not be 
deemed to have violated a no-strike pledge (and accompanying promise to 
arbitrate disputes) in a collective bargaining agreement.81 Violation of such a 
pledge may render a strike subject to injunction, and it is in this limited context 
that employee concerted activity is scrutinized for its objective reasonableness.82 
The § 7 inquiry has nothing to do with objective reasonableness and is focused 
exclusively on whether an employee subjectively believed that a threat to health 
and safety existed.83  
C. Intermittency and the Walmart Case 
Suppose that instead of engaging in a single work stoppage, Google workers 
had participated in a repetitive series of work stoppages over time. Or consider 
COVID-19 reactive work stoppages such as the sickouts at Amazon84—
stoppages in reaction to specific disease threats have been roiling the economy 
throughout the pandemic.85 Such work stoppages, by definition, do not consist 
 
 80. § 502 of the NLRA (as amended by the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947), 29 
U.S.C. § 143 (2018). 
 81. Nicholas A. Ashford & Judith I. Katz, Unsafe Working Conditions: Employee Rights 
Under the Labor Management Relations Act and the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 52 
NOTRE DAME LAWYER 802, 807 (1977). 
 82. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 414 U.S. 368, 380-81, 387-88 (1974) 
(“[A] union seeking to justify a contractually prohibited work stoppage under § 502 must present 
‘ascertainable, objective evidence supporting its conclusion that an abnormally dangerous 
condition for work exists.’”). This is not to suggest that there are no unresolved issues in the 
interpretation of § 502. For example, the NLRB and the Sixth Circuit seem to accept that the 
objective reasonableness requirement does not involve a danger-in-fact standard but rather requires 
that employees have a good faith belief supported by ascertainable, objective evidence. TNS, Inc. 
v. NLRB, 296 F.3d 384, 391, 393 (6th Cir. 2002). But as cases like NLRB v. Tamara Foods, Inc, 
have noted, § 502 does not appear to apply at all outside of the collective bargaining context. 692 
F.2d 1171, 1183 (8th Cir. 1982) 
 83. Tamara Foods, 258 N.L.R.B No. 180 (1981) (“The general rule is that the protections of 
Section 7 do ‘not depend on the manner in which the employees choose to press the dispute, but 
rather on the matter that they are protesting,’. . .Inquiry into the objective reasonableness of 
employees’ concerted activity is neither necessary nor proper in determining whether that activity 
is protected.”) (internal citations omitted) enforced in relevant part, 692 F.2d 1171, 1183 (8th Cir. 
1982). 
 84. See Paul, supra note 69. 
 85. See id. 
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of the kind of unitary, union-context event tending to be at the heart of traditional 
labor law—for example, a bargaining unit strike following months of collective 
bargaining negotiations that break down,86 or a single response to adverse 
working conditions.87 The hypothetical Google or actual COVID-19 series of 
job actions would be, or are, something closer to the kind of “intermittent,” or 
repeated, short-duration work stoppages that have often been found by the 
NLRB, and the courts, to be unprotected.88 The legislative history of the NLRA 
gives no indication that Congress ever considered the legality of such work 
stoppages, however.89 Furthermore, the line between merely repeated, but 
protected, work stoppages and unprotected intermittent work stoppages is 
sufficiently hazy—indeed, the NLRB initially held such work stoppages 
lawful90—that unrepresented employees might be hard-pressed to see it. The 
United States Supreme Court once held, in a union-context case, that the 
“recurrent or intermittent unannounced stoppage of work to win unstated ends 
was neither forbidden by Federal statute nor was it legalized and approved 
thereby.”91 The NLRB has carried forward and refined this rule with the core 
principle remaining that “hit and run” work stoppages deliberately calculated—
”planning” has repeatedly, but vaguely, been central to the analysis—to “harass 
the company into a state of confusion” are unprotected.92 Yet, as this author first 
wrote in 2007 and continues to think, “[t]o date, it does not appear that the NLRB 
has squarely addressed the legal status of intermittent work stoppages in a non-
 
 86. See e.g., Schaub v. Detroit Newspaper Agency, 154 F.3d 276, 277–78 (6th Cir. 1998) 
(chronicling the long and bitter Detroit Newspapers strike that commenced after collective 
bargaining negotiations broke down). 
 87. See e.g., Quietflex Mfg. Co., 344 N.L.R.B 1055, 1055 (2005) (discussing discharge of 83 
employees for refusing to vacate its parking lot where those employees had engaged in a peaceful 
hour work stoppage to protest their terms and conditions of employment). 
 88. Int’l Union, U. A. W., A. F. Of L., Local 232 v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245, 
264–65 (1949) overruled on other grounds; Lodge 76, Int’l. Ass’n of Machinists and Aerospace 
Workers, AFL-CIO v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132, 140, 154 (1976). 
 89. See Michael H. LeRoy, Creating Order Out of Chaos and Other Partial and Intermittent 
Strikes, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 221, 239 (2000). 
 90. Id. 
 91. Int’l Union, 336 U.S. at 264–65. 
 92. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 107 N.L.R.B No. 301, 1547, 1548, 1550 (1954). A second but 
lesser rationale appears to be that employees should not gain the “benefits” of striking without also 
being subjected to its “risks.” The “should not” portion of this formulation is another example of 
the NLRB’s penchant for employing terms like “indefensibility” or disloyalty when it wishes to 
“morally” condemn conduct that it does not like but is not easily condemnable under the National 
Labor Relations Act. See NLRB v. Ins. Agents’ Int’l Union, AFL-CIO, 361 U.S. 477, 495–96 
(1960) (holding that “nonstandard” labor activity even if unprotected is not, as the NLRB had 
found, unlawful under the NLRA); infra note 123 and accompanying text; see also Matthew W. 
Finkin, Disloyalty! Does Jefferson Standard Stalk Still?, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 541, 563–
64 (2007) (criticizing as extra-statutory the notion that employee misconduct described as 
“disloyal” may on that basis be denied protection under the NLRA). 
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union workplace directed against specific workplace grievances.”93 The NLRB 
has consistently held over the years that “repeated” work stoppages are protected 
when they are “spontaneous attempts to pursue work-related complaints or 
grievances and/or [sic] . . . which are precipitated by, and in protest against, 
separate acts of the employer.”94 It has also concluded that “recurrent” work 
stoppages are rendered unprotected when there is: 
[t]he occurrence of more than two separate strikes . . . the strikes are not 
responses to distinct employer actions or problems with working conditions, but 
rather part of a strategy to use a series of strikes in support of a single goal 
because this would be more crippling to the employer and/or would require less 
sacrifice by employees than a single prolonged work stoppage during which 
strikers could be replaced; . . . the union announces or otherwise states its intent 
to pursue a plan or strategy of intermittent strikes, or there is clear factual 
evidence of an orchestrated strategy to engage in intermittent strike activity, and 
[] the strikes are of short duration and proximate in time.95 
It does not appear that the NLRB has ever found a work stoppage among 
employees who are wholly unaffiliated with a union to be rendered unprotected 
because intermittent. The proposition that such work stoppages could be 
unprotected in non-union situations is in clear tension with § 7 cases in other 
NLRA contexts affording non-union employees solicitude.96 
In light of this, it is noteworthy that the NLRB’s recent decision in Walmart 
Stores, Inc.97 arose in a non-union workplace and deprived discharged 
employees of the protection of the NLRA for allegedly engaging in intermittent 
 
 93. Michael C. Duff, Days Without Immigrants: Analysis and Implications of the Treatment 
of Immigration Rallies Under the National Labor Relations Act, 85 DENV. U. L. REV. 93, 124 
(2007). 
 94. N.L.R.B. Gen. Couns. Advice Mem. 31-CA-23538 (Apr. 27, 1999); Westpac Elec., 321 
N.L.R.B 1322, 1360 (1996); Meilman Food Indus., 234 N.L.R.B No. 94, 698, 712 (1978); 
Overboard Door Corp., 220 N.L.R.B 431, 431–32 (1975) enforcement denied, 540 F.2d 878, 885 
(7thCir. 1978); Blades Mfg. Co., 144 N.L.R.B 561, 566 (1963). 
 95. Nat’l Steel and Shipbuilding Co., 324 N.L.R.B 499, 510 (1997); Case 31-CA-23538, 
N.L.R.B. Gen. Couns. Advice Mem. 31-CA-23538 (Apr. 27, 1999) (emphasis added) citing 
Chelsea Homes, Inc., 298 N.L.R.B 813, 831 (1990); Robertson Indus., 216 N.L.R.B 361, 362 
(1975) enforced, 560 F.2d 396, 397, 399 (9th Cir. 1976); GF Bus. Equip., 215 N.L.R.B 872, 878–
79 (1974), enforced, 529 F.2d 201, 202, 206 (8th Cir. 1975); Pacific Tel., 107 N.L.R.B at 1550, see 
infra notes 120, 124 and 141; John S. Swift Co., 124 N.L.R.B 394, 396 (1959); Polytech, Inc., 195 
N.L.R.B 695, 695, 697; Embossing Printers, 268 N.L.R.B 710, 722–23 (1984). The Memorandum 
may leave some readers with the impression that the NLRB and courts have rather deliberately 
developed a factor test over time for assessing when strikes are “intermittent” and when they are 
not. The factual variety and dates of cited administrative and court decisions, however, reveal the 
haphazardness of this patchwork “doctrine.” The same can be said of the even more factor-laden 
test laid out in another NLRB administrative document. N.L.R.B Advice Memorandum, WestFarm 
Foods, No. 19-CA-29147, at 8–9 (Jul. 22, 2004). 
 96. See Washington Aluminum, supra note 77 and accompanying text. 
 97. 368 N.L.R.B. No. 24, slip op. at 1 (2019). 
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work stoppages.98 Walmart purports to reaffirm prior holdings of the type 
already discussed—that “a strategy to return to work from a strike only to strike 
again for the same purpose is inconsistent with a genuine strike and has no 
protection in the Act.”99 The case involved a coordinated set of work stoppages 
at various Walmart stores in May and June 2013.100 The work stoppages were 
together titled the “Ride for Respect” and “most of the strikers travelled by bus 
to Bentonville, Arkansas, where they participated in actions and protests at and 
around Walmart’s headquarters during Walmart’s annual shareholders 
meeting.”101 Ultimately, Walmart fired fifty-five employees for violating 
attendance policies by engaging in the work stoppages, and defended against 
ensuing NLRB charges over the discharges on the grounds that the work 
stoppages were unprotected under the NLRA.102 Close inspection of the case 
reveals that on its facts, application of intermittent strike doctrine was improper: 
very few employees engaged in work stoppages, the stoppages were announced 
well in advance of transpiring—allowing Walmart ample time to lawfully 
replace employees had it wished to do so—and less than a majority of the 
discharged fifty-five employees engaged in more than one work stoppage.103 
Furthermore, out of Walmart’s 1.3 million employees, roughly 280 employees 
engaged in “Ride for Respect” work stoppages.104 In these circumstances, 
application of intermittent strike doctrine was not merely overbroad, it was 
incoherent. 
Of central concern to this discussion, however, is the majority’s failure to 
emphasize, as a matter of law, the fired employees’ lack of formal union 
representation. The assumption in the case seems to have been that the 
employees’ affiliation with the United Food and Commercial Workers’ Union 
(“UFCW”) was sufficient as a matter of law to establish that they were 
responsible for the union’s plan to “harass the company into a state of 
confusion.”105 That affiliation must be carefully examined, however. While the 
UFCW was leading the “Making Change at Walmart” campaign, which 
“challeng[ed] Walmart to help rebuild our economy and strengthen families,” it 
was not the employees’ certified union.106 The campaign consisted of “a 
coalition of Walmart associates, union members, small business owners, 
 
 98. Id. at 13, 15. 
 99. Id. at 3. 
 100. Id. at 12. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Walmart, slip. op. at 13, 36. 
 103. Gen. Couns.’s Answering Brief to Respondent’s Exceptions to the Decision of the Admin. 
Law Judge at 20, (Mar. 24, 2016), https://www.nlrb.gov/case/16-CA-096240 [https://perma.cc 
/M7A6-LPU4]. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Walmart, slip. op. at 18. 
 106. Id. at 15. 
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religious leaders, community organizations, women’s advocacy groups, multi-
ethnic coalitions, elected officials and ordinary citizens who believe that 
changing Walmart is vital for the future of our country” and sought to educate 
the public about this issue.107  
“The UFCW intended for the Making Change at Walmart campaign to be led by 
Walmart associates who wanted to see change at Walmart, and supported by 
community stakeholders who would join in calling on Walmart to be a ‘better 
employer’ since what happens at Walmart sets the tone for what happens across 
every aspect of private sector employment in the United States.”108 
The UFCW was affiliated with Organization United for Respect at Walmart 
(“OUR Walmart”), an organization founded in Maryland by a group of Walmart 
employees.109 UFCW considered OUR Walmart one of its “subsidiaries and 
lends it tactical, legal, and financial support.”110 UFCW and OUR Walmart were 
thus connected, though membership in OUR Walmart was:  
limited to current and former Walmart associates who complete the necessary 
membership paperwork and pay $5 each month for membership dues 
(customarily by personal check, credit card, debit card or money order). The 
UFCW takes the lead on collecting and processing monthly dues payments, 
which go into OUR Walmart’s bank account.111  
With respect to the case’s factual chronology: 
At an OUR Walmart leadership meeting held on August 22-23, 2012, OUR 
Walmart decided to begin using associate strikes as an additional tactic in its 
efforts to induce Walmart to change its policies . . . because its members did not 
believe that other tactics . . . were sufficiently effective in addressing OUR 
Walmart’s concerns about retaliation against OUR Walmart members.112  
OUR Walmart thereafter conducted work stoppages that were highly scripted—
even theatrical.113 OUR Walmart carried out highly publicized work stoppages 
 
 107. Id. at 18. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Walmart, slip. op. at 18–19. 
 111. Id. at 19. 
 112. Id. at 21. 
 113. Walmart, slip. op. at 22: 
To ensure that its members consistently adhered to the ULP strike strategy, OUR Walmart 
provided potential strikers with: a form letter to sign and deliver to Walmart when they 
went on strike; a script to read when they advised their store manager that they were going 
on strike; a form letter to sign and deliver to Walmart when strikers were ready to return to 
work; and a script to read when strikers advised their store manager that they were ready to 
return to work. Each of those documents emphasized OUR Walmart’s ULP strike strategy 
by stating that the associates went on strike “to protest Walmart’s attempts to silence 
Associates who have spoken out against things like Walmart’s low take home pay, 
unpredictable work schedules, unaffordable health benefits, and Walmart’s retaliation 
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and other concerted activities. On October 4, 2012 (at a Walmart store in Pico 
Rivera, California), October 9 and 10, 2012 (at various Walmart stores around 
the country and at a Walmart headquarters meeting of financial analysts), and 
“[t]hroughout November 2012 [when it] continued with its plan to hold 
additional actions and strikes at various Walmart stores, including multiple 
actions and strikes that occurred on Black Friday 2012, one of Walmart’s busiest 
shopping days.”114 At one point, Walmart filed an unfair labor practice charge 
against OUR Walmart for alleged unlawful picketing.115 
Various similar OUR Walmart actions—strikes and “caravans” in the “Ride 
for Respect”—continued throughout the spring and early summer in 2013.116 At 
one point, in February 2013, Walmart decided that it would not discipline 
employees for strikes held in October or November 2012 but warned that it 
“would apply its attendance policy to any future strikes.”117 On about June 21, 
2013, Walmart applied its discipline policy to employees engaging in work 
stoppages thereby missing shifts during the late-May and early-June Ride for 
Respect campaign.118 Walmart eventually fired fifty-five employees for 
violation of the company’s attendance policy; forty other employees received 
lesser discipline.119 Work stoppages and other concerted activities nevertheless 
continued into the summer and fall of 2013, including “Black Friday,” the day 
after Thanksgiving in November 2013.120 
Concern over this factually complex case has been expressed by commentators 
lamenting the generally uncertain contours of intermittency doctrine, and the 
NLRB’s unprecedented division of work stoppages into “genuine” and “non-
genuine”;  
I believe that the Board’s protection only for what it deems “genuine” strikes 
raises serious equity issues for many low-wage, non-union workers, effectively 
denying them the right to strike . . . Think about what it takes for workers to 
engage in a “genuine” strike; that is, a strike in which all the workers walk off 
the job and stay off until the underlying labor dispute is resolved, either by 
 
against those who have spoken out.” . . . Similarly, OUR Walmart advised strikers that if 
they made signs to carry during a demonstration while on strike, the associates should write 
“Unfair Labor Practice Strike” on their sign, and select one of . . . six slogans . . . 
 114. Id. at 22–23. 
 115. This author has written about the uncertain liability of groups like OUR Walmart—that 
organize and advocate on behalf of employees without either having been certified by the NLRA 
or recognized as exclusive representatives by the involved employer—for unfair practice liability 
under § 8(b)(4) and 8(b)(7) of the National Labor Relations act. See Michael C. Duff, Alt-Labor, 
Secondary Boycotts, and Toward a Labor Organization Bargain, 63 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 837, 
842 (2014). 
 116. Walmart, slip. op. at 27–28. 
 117. Id. at 25. 
 118. Id. at 29. 
 119. Id. at 29, 30, 59. 
 120. Id. at 30. 
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agreement or the union’s capitulation. Because employers have the right to 
permanently replace economic strikers, a genuine strike is likely to go on for a 
long time, unless workers are highly skilled and therefore difficult to replace. To 
sustain a long strike, workers have to either be able to go without a paycheck for 
a substantial period of time or have access to a well-resourced strike fund. That 
makes a traditional strike a viable option primarily for well-paid workers or 
workers who are represented by large unions with significant reserves.121 
Still, this vague bifurcation is not necessarily inconsistent with Board 
doctrine denying protection to work stoppages planned to “harass the company 
into a state of confusion.”122 A “purely” harassing work stoppage under this 
rubric could be considered “non-genuine.”123 It might, of course, also be argued 
that the “genuineness” of a motive for a work stoppage is a slender reed on which 
to hang protection in any situation—all work stoppages, after all, are meant to 
drive a company into some state of confusion.124 Work stoppages are, by 
definition, economic weapons.125 Weapons do harm. That is the point of using 
 
 121. Sharon Block, Making Bad Law Worse: The Inequity of the Board’s Walmart Decision, 
ON LABOR (Aug. 20, 2019), https://onlabor.org/making-bad-law-worse-the-inequity-of-the-boards 
-walmart-decision/ [https://perma.cc/JZX4-WXWE]. 
 122. Walmart, slip op. at 3. 
 123. There is no denying, however, that the NLRB has developed the tendency of classifying 
effective employee economic weapons as “ungenuine.” See Toering Electric Co, 351 N.L.R.B. 225, 
225, 240, 244 (2007) (ruling that in any refusal-to-hire case where an employer puts at issue the 
applicant’s interest in actually working for the employer, the General Counsel of the NLRB must 
produce evidence demonstrating the applicant for employment was genuinely interested in seeking 
to establish an employment relationship with the employer, thereby creating an entirely new burden 
for proving violations in such cases, and reversing the Board’s presumption that any individual who 
submitted an application was entitled to the protection of the NLRA). The doctrinal development 
was in response to union “salting” campaigns in which unions had been having success in 
surreptitiously organized employees. 
 124. As the Supreme Court expressed this idea in NLRB v. Insurance Agents Int’l Union, a 
case in which it held that vexatious use by a union of nonstandard economic weapons could not 
independently violate the NLRA: 
The presence of economic weapons in reserve, and their actual exercise on occasion by the 
parties, is part and parcel of the system that the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts have 
recognized. Abstract logical analysis might find inconsistency between the command of the 
statute to negotiate toward an agreement in good faith and the legitimacy of the use of 
economic weapons, frequently having the most serious effect upon individual workers and 
productive enterprises, to induce one party to come to the terms desired by the other. But 
the truth of the matter is that at the present statutory stage of our national labor relations 
policy, the two factors—necessity for good-faith bargaining between parties, and the 
availability of economic pressure devices to each to make the other party incline to agree 
on one’s terms—exist side by side. 
361 U.S. 477, 489 (1960). In short, not even the NLRB can restrict these kinds of economic 
weapons. See also American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 318 (1965) (NLRB cannot 
restrict employer lockouts). 
 125. The General Counsel cited in its Walmart trial papers for this proposition Allied 
Mechanical Services, Inc., 341 N.L.R.B. 1084, 1102 (2004) (“a requirement that a strike not be 
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them. The manner in which any work stoppage harms an employer is to disrupt 
normal operating procedures, thereby raising costs. Confusion is part and parcel 
of the use of any economic weapon, as anyone who has ever been personally 
involved in a labor dispute will attest.126 The critical issue for intermittent strike 
doctrine analysis, however, is planning—and, read in context, the cases are 
concerned with whether work stoppages were planned to confuse employers and 
to prevent them from permanently replacing employees engaged in a work 
stoppage. In Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co.,127 for example, the 
Communications Workers of America engaged in a pattern of “hit and run” work 
stoppages triggering scrutiny under intermittent work stoppage doctrine.  
The scheme was designed to compel the Respondent to “get its defenses up” —
or gather substitute workers wherever a stoppage was unexpectedly pulled— 
“only to have the picket line gone” when the emergency crews reached the 
picketed place. Thus, the traffic employees in a great many of the division’s 
more than 200 offices walked off their jobs on different days instead of all at the 
same time; at many offices they returned to work after a short time and then 
walked out again after a day or two; and in some offices they again returned to 
work briefly and later quit anew a third time. Meanwhile, CWA pickets ranged 
over the entire division, appearing sporadically at a great number of offices.128 
The NLRB’s objection was that the design of the hit and run tactics was to 
limit the ability of the employer to react quickly to changing tactics. It has 
always seemed very unclear why that should matter.129 As the NLRB has 
 
disruptive of an employer’s operations, or harassing to it, is a requirement that the strike not be 
conducted”), enforced Allied Mechanical Services, Inc. v. N.L.R.B, 668 F.3d 758 (D.C. Cir. 2012); 
Swope Ridge Geriatric Center, 350 N.L.R.B 64, 67 (2007) (“It is axiomatic that the very purpose 
of a strike is to cause disruption, both operationally and economically, to an employer’s business 
operations”). Interestingly, the Taft-Hartley Act’s 1947 amendment of the National Labor Relations 
Act defined a strike as “any strike or other concerted stoppage of work by employees (including a 
stoppage by reason of the expiration of a collective-bargaining agreement) and any concerted 
slowdown or other concerted interruption of operations by employees.” 29 U.S.C. § 142(2) (2018) 
(emphases added). 
 126. The right, after all, has never been “absolute.” Employees may be disciplined for “‘slow-
down,’ ‘sit-in,’ and arguably unprotected disloyal tactics.” See Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. at 494. 
Any strike might be seen as disloyal or as a “slowdown,” and there is little controversy in present 
times that strikes in which employees stop working but refuse to leave the employer’s premises are 
trespassory. See NLRB. v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 266–67 (1939). 
 127. 107 N.L.R.B 1547, 1548. 
 128. Id. 
 129. As already mentioned, the conduct could not of itself violate the NLRA. Insurance Agents, 
361 U.S. at 494–95, and although the NLRB clearly has the authority to make case-by-case 
determinations about the limits of protection afforded to “partial” strikes, id., it would certainly 
also have the authority to draw careful lines in this area. See Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB., 437 U.S. 556, 
574–75 (1978) (“It may be that the ‘nature of the problem, as revealed by unfolding variant 
situations,’ requires ‘an evolutionary process for its rational response, not a quick, definitive 
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elsewhere frankly acknowledged, “the principle of these cases is that employees 
cannot properly seek to maintain the benefits of remaining in a paid employee 
status while refusing, nonetheless, to perform all of the work they were hired to 
do.”130 The prohibition sounds vaguely equitable. But more than this, these rules 
presume the existence of a sophisticated, organized planner, and it is hard to see 
how an ad hoc group of non-union employees could presumptively be 
considered as such. This is almost certainly why the NLRB has never found that 
intermittency deprived non-union work stoppages of protection. This 
background principle is in evidence in Roseville Dodge v. NLRB.131 In that case, 
the Eighth Circuit rebuffed an employer’s argument that non-union employees 
engaged in an unprotected intermittent work stoppage, and additionally lost the 
protection of the NLRA by remaining on the employer’s property during the 
stoppage, thereby rendering their conduct trespassory.132 In response to the 
arguments, the court said, “[t]he evidence shows that this work stoppage was a 
peaceful attempt by unsophisticated workers to notify the company—which did 
not have a grievance procedure—of their dissatisfaction with working 
conditions because other methods of communication had proven futile.”133 
D. Marquess of Queensberry Rules Applied to Non-Union Employees 
However one might feel about these “equitable” Marquess of Queensberry 
Rules,134 especially in light of employers’ robust rights to permanently replace 
and lock out employees engaging in (or even thinking about engaging in) a work 
stoppage,135 the prototypical intermittent work stoppage case involves a 
union.136 It has been tacitly assumed that only unions strategically plan work 
stoppages around organizing campaigns or contract bargaining disputes.137 
Indeed, “intermittent strike doctrine” carries in it a hint of union misconduct, 
though it is very clear that whatever else intermittent work stoppages may be 
they are not unlawful.138 Walmart is disquieting because it vaguely exports this 
union misconduct theory—however unsupported by the text of the NLRA—to 
 
formula as a comprehensive answer.’”) (quoting Local 761, Electrical Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 
667, 674 (1961)). 
 130. Polytech, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B 695, 696 (1972). 
 131. 882 F.2d 1355, 1358–59 (8th Cir. 1989). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 1359. 
 134. A code of “fair” rules of boxing that influenced modern boxing. See MARQUESS OF 
QUEENSBERRY RULES, ENCYC. BRITANNICA (Aug. 25, 2020), https://www.britannica.com/sports 
/Marquess-of-Queensberry-rules [https://perma.cc/8EFT-6NP5.]. 
 135. See Moshe Marvit, Is It Time for the Courts to End Labor Lockouts?, THE CENTURY 
FOUNDATION (Aug. 25, 2020), https://tcf.org/content/report/time-courts-end-labor-lockouts 
/?agreed=1. 
 136. See Roseville Dodge, supra note 131. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Walmart, slip op. at 3. 
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non-union employees, and maybe also to what, in context, was a civil society 
organization. Although the group was coordinated by a union, it consisted of a 
multiplicity of groups. A “coalition of Walmart associates, union members, 
small business owners, religious leaders, community organizations, women’s 
advocacy groups, multi-ethnic coalitions, elected officials and ordinary citizens 
who believe that changing Walmart is vital for the future of our country.”139 It 
is as if employees who were not members of a union were being held responsible 
for alleged violations of the NLRA by a union that was not their own.140 Though 
OUR Walmart and the UFCW were actors in the surrounding drama,141 the 
NLRB did not find OUR Walmart to be a labor organization, and the NLRB’s 
General Counsel did not plead the discharge of the employees engaging in the 
work stoppages as discrimination against union activity.142 In short, there was 
no union formally involved in the case. None of the cases cited by the NLRB as 
instances in which intermittent work stoppages were found unprotected involved 
non-union employees.143 Thus, the distinction between unionized employees 
 
 139. Id. at 18. 
 140. The situation is distinguishable from those in which employees make common cause with 
other unionized employees known to be engaging in an unlawful work stoppage. See Swift & Co., 
124 N.L.R.B. 394, 398 (1959). Here, there is no finding that the union violated the NLRA. Thus, 
there is no unlawful conduct with which employees could have made common cause. And to be 
sure, well-organized, alternative labor organizations affiliated with traditional unions—so called 
“alt labor”—may themselves have some appreciation of when their activities may expose them to 
liability. See generally Michael C. Duff, Alt-Labor, Secondary Boycotts, and Toward a Labor 
Organization Bargain, 63 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. 837, 837–38 (2014). But it is extremely 
questionable whether tactical work stoppage understandings by such groups could reasonably be 
attributable to loosely-affiliated alt-labor group members. Of course, the argument applies with 
even greater force where no labor organization of any kind is present. 
 141. Walmart, Sections II.B and II.C of ALJ’s decision. Slip op. at 27, 45. 
 142. Under section 2(5) of the NLRA, labor organization is defined as “any organization of any 
kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate 
and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning 
grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.” 29 
U.S.C. § 152(5) (2018). OUR Walmart may satisfy the definition, but conflict with a “union” or 
application of intermittent strike doctrine in a unionized context. 
 143. Farley Candy Co., 300 N.L.R.B. 849, 850 (1990) (union context); Honolulu Rapid Transit 
Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 1806, 1807–1811 (1954) (unprotected where union admittedly designed scheme 
to strike only on weekends); Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 1547, 1548–1550 
(unprotected where “[CWA’s—a union’s] announced strategy consisted of a multiplicity of little 
‘hit and run’ work stoppages deliberately calculated, in CWA’s own words, to ‘harass the company 
into a state of confusion’”). The NLRB might have cited Yale University, 330 N.L.R.B. 246, 253–
54 (1999) (finding unprotected a graduate students’ grade strike withholding papers and test 
materials). Although the strike in that case was distinguishable as a “partial” strike, it is true that 
the graduate students involved were not represented by a union. The case is factually 
distinguishable, however, in that the students were members of the Graduate Employees and 
Students Organization, had been seeking formal recognition as a union with Yale for three years, 
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and non-union workers was ignored in the decision, as was the nature of the 
“Making Change at Walmart” campaign as multi-organizational. 
The obliteration of the line between union-represented and non-union 
employees in the context of intermittency analysis is a mistake. A presumption 
of protection should be made explicit in non-union work stoppage contexts. It is 
possible to persuasively argue for this position from the NLRB’s reaffirmation 
in Walmart that “work stoppages responding to distinct employer actions or 
issues, even if close in time, are simply not pursuant to a plan to strike 
intermittently for the same goal and are therefore protected.”144 A plan to “strike 
and strike again,” in response to “distinct employer actions or issues,”145 is 
essentially a restatement of the right to engage in a work stoppage. After all, 
there is nothing legally problematic about a labor organization planning what it 
has a right to do. One is reminded of Oliver Wendall Holmes’s famous labor law 
observation that one may lawfully “threaten” what one has a right to do.146 As 
the NLRB long ago stated in Polytech, Inc.,147 a case in which non-union 
employees were alleged to have engaged in an unprotected intermittent work 
stoppage, 
This analysis . . . demonstrated the existence of a presumption that a single 
concerted refusal to work overtime is a protected strike activity; and that such 
presumption should be deemed rebutted when and only when the evidence 
demonstrates that the stoppage is part of a plan or pattern of intermittent action 
which is inconsistent with a genuine strike or genuine performance by 
employees of the work normally expected of them by the employer.148 
The strengthened presumption of protection embodied in Polytech should be 
explicitly extended. Where employees are not represented by a union, it should 
be understood that they must speak for themselves as best they can.149 The 
 
and was intertwined with the question of whether the graduate students were statutory employees. 
Id. 
 144. Walmart Stores Inc., 368 N.L.R.B. No. 24, slip op. at 2 (2019). 
 145. See N.L.R.B. Gen. Couns. Advice Mem., supra note 94, slip op. at 3–4 (Apr. 27, 1999). 
 146. Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 107 (1896) 
(“I pause here to remark that the word ‘threats’ often is used as if, when it appeared that 
threats had been made, it appeared that unlawful conduct had begun. But it depends on what 
you threaten. As a general rule, even if subject to some exceptions, what you may do in a 
certain event you may threaten to do, that is, give warning of your intention to do in that 
event, and thus allow the other person the chance of avoiding the consequences. So as to 
“compulsion,” it depends on how you ‘compel.’”). 
So too, one may argue, may you “plan.” 
 147. 195 N.L.R.B. 695, 696 (1972). 
 148. Id. at 696–697. Possibly no greater example of the “reaction” versus “plan” idea could be 
conceived than the non-union work stoppages that spread during the COVID-19 pandemic which 
seem to come close to utterly unplanned, reflexive acts of survival. See supra. at Part II.B. 
 149. See Washington Aluminum, supra note 31, at 14. Of course, none of this is to suggest that 
employers did not already possess the burden of showing that a lawful strike had for some reason 
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NLRB has probably implicitly been following this policy all along, since there 
are few (if any) reported cases in which employees wholly unconnected with a 
union were found to have engaged in unprotected intermittent work 
stoppages.150 In Walmart, a presumption of protection may have been rebuttable 
given the nature of the “Making Change at Walmart” campaign and the union 
affiliation—even if informal—of the fired employees. But the NLRB and the 
courts have previously applied absence of union representation (or a formal 
grievance procedure) as a mitigating factor in determining whether employees’ 
work stoppages are unprotected,151 and it should strengthen and make more 
explicit that principle.152 It is deeply disturbing that the NLRB utilized a case 
like Walmart—in which intermittent strike doctrine was inapplicable on the 
facts—to increase the risk of clumsy application of the doctrine to the new, non-
union economy. 
III.  SOME WORK STOPPAGE IMPLICATIONS OF A “NO ONE’S AN EMPLOYEE” 
ECONOMY 
To this point, the discussion has centered on problems applicable to 
“employees” who are clearly covered under the NLRA, with the major analytical 
division in Part II focusing on distinctions between “union” and “non-union” 
employees. The next of the major complexities the article will consider, 
however—the issue of who is an employee under the NLRA, or for that matter 
under any labor or employment law—in some respects stands the previous 
discussion on its head.153 Here, the discussion centers on problems potentially 
 
lost its protection. Silver State Disposal Serv., 326 N.L.R.B. No. 25, 84, 85 (1998) (holding that an 
employer bears the burden of showing that work stoppage is unprotected) (citing Mastro Plastics 
Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 350 U.S. 270, 277 (1956) (acknowledging that whether a work stoppage is 
unprotected because it violates a no-strike clause is an affirmative defense)). The point here is that 
the burden should be heavier in circumstances where employees are wholly unaffiliated with a 
union. 
 150. This author has been unable to locate any such cases and the General Counsel made the 
same observation in his briefing of Walmart. Gen. Couns.’s Answering Brief to Respondent’s 
Exceptions to Decision of Admin. Law Judge at 13, 21; Walmart Stores, Inc., 368 N.L.R.B. No. 24 
(2019) (No. 16-CA-096240). 
 151. Quietflex Mfg., 344 N.L.R.B. 1055, 1057 (2005) (“whether employees were represented 
or had an established grievance procedure”); First Nat’l Bank of Omaha v. N.L.R.B., 413 F.2d 921, 
926 (1969) (upholding NLRB protection of a concerted employee work stoppage because “[h]ere, 
the employees were unorganized and were not covered by a collective bargaining agreement”). 
 152. Scholar George Schatzki once made an even more expansive argument: employees should 
not pay with their jobs when engaging in concerted activity they did not know to be wrongful. 
George Schatzki, Some Observations and Suggestions Concerning a Misnomer—“Protected” 
Concerted Activities, 47 TEX. L. REV. 378, 402 (1969). 
 153. For extended description of the fragmentation of the employment relationship see DAVID 
WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME SO BAD FOR SO MANY AND WHAT CAN 
BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT 17, 21 (2014). 
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surfacing if workers engaging in concerted activity that would likely otherwise 
be protected under the NLRA are not statutory employees.  
A. No Protection 
It is elementary that if a worker engages in lawful concerted activity but is 
found not to be an employee within the meaning of the NLRA, she does not 
enjoy the protection of the NLRA.154 It may seem odd to think of non-employees 
such as independent contractors engaging in work stoppages. The narrative of 
the Gig economy—a heavy utilizer of independent contractors, after all—is that 
such workers are free agents who are at complete liberty to come and go as they 
please. This narrative seems to render the idea of a work stoppage incoherent, 
since an “independent” worker could simply leave.155 One might also assume 
that a non-employee would know she did not possess the right to engage in a 
work stoppage. But these assumptions may not comport with economic 
reality.156 Gig work and alternative work arrangements are extremely 
heterogeneous.157 Aside from the lawyerly problem of determining a worker’s 
actual employment status (often after an adverse action of some type has already 
been taken against a putative employee by a putative employer), is the problem 
of how a worker could be expected to accurately predict that status in advance 
of engaging in workplace-related concerted activities. In California, for 
example, a worker designated an independent contractor by the company for 
 
 154. NLRA, Section 7 states only “employees” have “the right to self-organization, to form, 
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own 
choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or 
other mutual aid or protection . . . .” Moreover, it is an unfair labor practice for an employer “to 
interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7” 
(emphasis supplied). NLRA Section 13 states, “Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided 
for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the 
right to strike or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right.” From the confluence of 
these two sections, the right of employees to strike has never been questioned but has been 
qualified. See NAT’L LAB. RELS. BOARD, THE RIGHT TO STRIKE, https://www.nlrb.gov 
/strikes [https://perma.cc/Z7D4-B749] (last visited Aug. 20, 2020). 
 155. See Guidance Letter from U.S. Department of Labor, Wage and Hour Division (Apr. 29, 
2019), https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/WHD/legacy/files/2019_04_29_06_FLSA.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/43Y5-D7PR] (discussing whether “service providers” are employees and 
answering in the negative based in part on fact that they “appear to maintain a high degree of 
freedom to exit the working relationship”) (on file with U.S. Department of Labor). 
 156. The United Nations, for example, recognizes that the identity of “employers” and 
“employees” is a challenge to attempting to apply law to the Gig economy. Hannah Johnston & 
Chris Land-Kazlauskas, Organizing On-Demand: Representation, Voice, and Collective 
Bargaining in the Gig Economy, INT’L LABOUR OFF. 1, 5 (2019). 
 157. See GIG ECON. DATA HUB, CORNELL U. ILR SCHOOL  https://www.gigeconomydata.org/ 
(exploring the great variety of “Gig” work arrangements and explaining in part that traditional 
definitions of “employee” and “independent contractor” are problematic), [https://perma.cc/D4CV-
B69S] (last visited Aug. 20, 2020). 
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whom she works may in fact be an employee as a matter of state law.158 The 
California definition, however, would not be controlling under the NLRA under 
a recent shift in employee definition by the NLRB which sharply departs from 
both the California and traditional common law employee definitions.159 
Perhaps even worse, different employee definitions under various state 
employment laws may apply in the worker’s state.160 Thus, even if a worker 
knows generally about the right of “employees” to engage in work stoppages, 
she may also realize that she—as a possible non-employee—engages in such 
conduct at her peril. In an economy in which millions of precarious workers are 
unilaterally designated independent contractors,161 or as other forms of “non-
employee” Gig workers,162 the narrowed employee definition endangers 
workers’ rights to engage in work stoppages in at least two ways. First, a worker 
may erroneously believe she is an employee, when in fact she is an independent 
 
 158. Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court of L.A., 416 P.3d 1, 7 (Cal. 2018) 
(applying ABC employment test to a large swath of California economy in opinion expressing 
broad concern with widespread workers misclassification). With respect to the ABC test: 
Some courts using this test look at whether a worker meets three separate criteria to be 
considered an independent contractor: 1) The worker is free from the employer’s control or 
direction in performing the work; 2) The work takes place outside the usual course of the 
business of the company and off the site of the business; 3) Customarily, the worker is 
engaged in an independent trade, occupation, profession, or business. 
LEGAL INFO. INST., CORNELL LAW SCHOOL, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/abc_test 
[https://perma.cc/C53N-GZK3] (last visited (Aug. 20, 2020). 
Dynamex and its ABC standard has now been codified under California law. Cal. Lab. Code § 
2750.3 (2019). There is continuing confusion over who is or is not an employee under California 
law and employee standards differ within the state for purposes of workers’ compensation law. 
S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v. Dept. of Indus. Rels., 769 P.2d 399, 404 (Cal. 1989) (establishing use 
of common law, multifactor test in workers’ compensation cases). 
 159. SuperShuttle DFW, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. No. 75 (2019) (placing unusual emphasis on 
workers’ “entrepreneurial opportunity” in contradistinction to the common law’s traditional 
emphasis on control over working conditions). Whatever this new standard may come to mean, it 
is far different than California’s ABC test, and seems much more likely to produce findings of 
independent contractor status. 
 160. See, e.g., Carmago’s Case, 96 N.E.3d 673, 675 (Mass. 2018) (upholding different 
employee definitions under Massachusetts workers’ compensation and independent contractor 
statutes). 
 161. The number of independent contractors in the U.S. is frequently disputed. The Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS) found the figure to be 6.9% of the work force as of 2017. Tracking the 
Changing Nature of Work: the Process Continues, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STAT. (Feb. 12, 2019), 
https://blogs.bls.gov/blog/tag/independent-contractors/ [https://perma.cc/4E8R-72BS]. On the 
other hand, the BLS also admits that it has no working definition for a gig worker. Id. Apparently 
the imprecision holds true in a number of quarters. For example, Edison Research Company polls 
have estimated that 24% of workers over the age of 18 are participating in the gig economy. Gig 
Economy, Marketplace-Edison Research Poll, EDISON RSCH. (Dec. 2018), http://www.edisonre 
search.com/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Gig-Economy-2018-Marketplace-Edison-Research-Poll-
FINAL.pdf. [https://perma.cc/9RRZ-SQBB]. 
 162. See Schatzki, supra note 152, at 402. 
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contractor. This misapprehension may lead to legal consequences that will be 
discussed in the next two subsections if the worker does engage in a work 
stoppage. Second, confusion over employee status could severely chill 
employees’ rights to engage in work stoppages. Workers may be unwilling to 
engage in the protected activity if there is any significant doubt about their 
employee status. Such statute-disrupting outcomes, if desired, should be 
implemented by Congress and not left to happenstance. 
B. The Labor Injunction 
A more subtle problem than non-protection exists if workers are broadly 
deemed not to be employees under the NLRA (or perhaps under any statute). 
Under the Norris-LaGuardia Act (“NLA”),163 federal courts have been carefully 
restricted from issuing injunctions in peaceful “labor disputes” unless an 
injunction is specifically authorized under the NLRA.164 A “labor dispute” is 
defined under the NLA as, “any controversy concerning terms or conditions of 
employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in 
negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or 
conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in 
the proximate relation of employer and employee.”165 As will be discussed, 
some courts, focused on the statutory employment predicate of an NLA “labor 
dispute,” have held that disputes between employers and independent 
contractors are not “labor disputes” within the meaning of the NLA.166  
It follows that, where courts determine workers are independent contractors, 
those same courts may conclude that they are authorized to enjoin peaceful 
protest activity by independent contractors, supplementing courts’ explicit 
authorization to issue labor injunctions under the NLRA.167 Thus, in the Google 
 
 163. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (2018). 
 164.  
No court of the United States, as defined in this chapter, shall have jurisdiction to issue any 
restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in a case involving or growing out 
of a labor dispute, except in a strict conformity with the provisions of this chapter; nor shall 
any such restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction be issued contrary to the 
public policy declared in this chapter. 
29 U.S.C. § 101 (2018). 
 165. 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (2018) (emphasis added). 
 166. Columbia River Packers Ass’n v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143, 144–45 (1942) (dispute between 
fish buyers and fish sellers not labor dispute within meaning of NLA, so district court injunction of 
alleged underlying antitrust conduct upheld); Taylor v. Local No. 7, Int’l. U. of Journeymen 
Horseshoers, 353 F.2d 593, 601 (4th Cir. 1965) (farriers not employees and accordingly no labor 
dispute existed within meaning of the NLA). 
 167. Under the NLRA, federal courts may issue preliminary injunctions against parties where 
there is reason to believe the NLRA has been violated and where it is “just and proper” to do so. 
Federal courts may also issue injunctions against labor organizations for a variety of violations 
including, but not limited to, engaging in unlawful secondary activity, engaging in unlawful 
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example in which workers were protesting alleged “buyouts” of managers 
accused of sexual harassment, it is noteworthy that more than half of Google’s 
220,000-person workforce are independent contractors.168 Given what has just 
been said about the non-applicability of the NLA to independent contractors, a 
federal district court, not faced with an NLA “labor dispute,” might have had 
jurisdiction to enjoin the Google protest despite its peaceful character. A federal 
court must, of course, have some underlying jurisdiction over a dispute in order 
to have injunctive power in connection with it, but courts in the past seemed able 
to fashion a variety of jurisdictional theories, which was one of the major reasons 
Congress enacted the NLA to protect employees’ right to engage in peaceful 
labor activity.169 
It may not be immediately apparent why the ability of a federal court to issue 
an injunction in a peaceful “labor” dispute matters. In The Labor Injunction, a 
volume co-written by then-Harvard law professor and later Supreme Court 
Justice Felix Frankfurter and Nathan Greene,170 the authors argued that a labor 
 
picketing, and striking in violation of a contractual no-strike pledge. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(h), (j), 
(l) (2018). 
 168. Todd Haselton, Senators Demand Google Make Contractors Full-Time Employees, 
CNBC (Aug. 5, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/05/senators-demand-google-make-contrac 
tors-full-time-employees.html [https://perma.cc/WC8Z-YFBY]; Daisuke Wakabayashi, Google’s 
Shadow Work Force: Temps Who Outnumber Full-Time Employees, N.Y. TIMES (May 28, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/28/technology/google-temp-workers.html [https://perma.cc/P 
5KV-VWZR]. 
 169. Michael C. Duff, Labor Injunctions in Bankruptcy: The Norris-LaGuardia Firewall, 2009 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 669, 677–81 (2009). 
 170. See generally FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREEN, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930); 
see also Thomas R. Haggard, The Power of the Bankruptcy Court to Enjoin Strikes: Resolving the 
Apparent Conflict Between the Bankruptcy Code and the Anti-Injunction Provisions of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703, 706 (1985). One commentator has alleged that the 
personal biases of Frankfurter and Greene influenced those authors’ conclusions. See generally 
Sylvester Petro, Injunctions and Labor Disputes: 1880-1932. Part 1. What the Courts Actually Did 
- and Why, 14 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 341 (1978). Even if this were true, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 
was nevertheless a primary influence on Congress and is therefore an indispensable resource for 
divining congressional intent in enacting the NLGA. For evidence that the Congress believed the 
conclusions of Frankfurter and Greene, and a good deal more, consider the statement of Rep. 
McGugin made on the House floor on March 8, 1932: 
Some day and some time, when the history of this country is written, some historian will 
obtain a copy of one of these tyrannical labor injunction decrees and will point out how far 
the courts went in excess of their rights and contrary to human liberty and righteousness. 
Injunctions enjoining a man from talking to his neighbor about anything which he may want 
to discuss, whether it be a strike or a labor dispute, or what not, is contrary to the true 
principles of liberty. If there were not a single laboring man in the United States asking for 
this bill, we should curb the power of the courts in granting these injunctions, upon the 
broad principle that such injunctions are a menace to liberty. [Applause.] 
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injunction issued by a court against a union during the early stages of a work 
stoppage will tend to permanently defeat employees engaged in a labor 
dispute.171 The labor injunction has always been provocative.172 Throughout the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the federal judiciary created legal 
doctrines to justify issuance of injunctions in labor disputes, grounded in various 
substantive areas, including breach of contract173 and interference with railroad 
receiverships.174 Although this labor injunction history emerged in the context 
of union activity, there is no reason to suppose that an injunction issued against 
non-union worker protest would not equally tend to suspend and chill work 
stoppages, effectively cloaking the merits of a workplace dispute in a manner 
benefiting the target of the protest.175 
How does an independent contractor protest “working conditions” free from 
the threat of federal injunction, if one is not an employee? A response to this 
non-union worker injunction conundrum was suggested in an older opinion of 
the Supreme Court in Columbia River Packers’ Association v. Hinton.176 In that 
case, a packers’ association possessed plants for processing and canning fish in 
the Pacific Northwest.177 It procured its fish primarily from independent 
fishermen, who, while members of the Pacific Coast Fishermen’s Union, were 
found to be independent “entrepreneurs,” and not employees of the packers’ 
association.178 The union acted as a “collective bargaining agency” in the sale 
of fish caught by its members, and the union’s internal rules forbade its members 
from providing fish to producers like the packers’ association “outside of Union 
 
75 CONG. REC. 5500 (1932). For a general critique of Petro’s methods see William E. Forbath, The 
Shaping of the Labor Movement, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1250–51 n.601 (1989) [hereinafter 
Shaping of the Labor Movement]. 
 171. FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 170, at 201. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. at 39–40. Indeed, the entirety of Section 3 of the NLGA is devoted to rendering 
unenforceable in federal courts the “yellow dog” contract, an agreement between an employer and 
employee that the employee would refrain from joining or remaining a member of a union. A 
union’s alleged interference with such a contract was one method by which employers had 
successfully “federalized” labor disputes, making them susceptible to federal injunction. See, e.g., 
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 19 (1915). 
 174. FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 170, at 23. 
 175. Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 457 U.S. 702, 716 
(1982)  
(“The legislative history is replete with criticisms of the ability of powerful employers to 
use federal judges as ‘strike-breaking’ agencies; by virtue of their almost unbridled 
‘equitable discretion,’ federal judges could enter injunctions based on their disapproval of 
the employees’ objectives, or on the theory that these objectives or actions, although lawful 
if pursued by a single employee, became unlawful when pursued through the ‘conspiracy’ 
of concerted activity”). 
 176. 315 U.S. 143, 143 (1942). 
 177. Id. at 144. 
 178. Id. at 145. 
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agreements.”179 The union’s standard contracts of sale also required buyers like 
the packers’ association not to purchase fish from nonmembers of the union.180 
The packers’ association refused these terms, and the union in turn induced its 
members to refrain from selling fish to the association.181 Because the union’s 
control of the fish supply was extensive, the association was unable to obtain the 
fish it needed to carry on its business.182 The packers’ association filed suit 
alleging that the union’s actions violated federal antitrust law.183 A federal 
district court agreed with the association’s position, found a violation of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act, and issued an injunction requiring the union to cease and 
desist in its actions.184 The Ninth Circuit reversed, finding that issuance of the 
injunction violated the NLA: “[t]he injunction . . . was granted without 
jurisdiction to do so, and the portion of the decree granting an injunction must 
be stricken.”185 In other words, the Ninth Circuit found that the NLA applied to 
the dispute; but, in reversing that decision, the Supreme Court stated,  
[t]he controversy here is altogether between fish sellers and fish buyers. The 
sellers are not employees of the petitioners or of any other employer nor do they 
seek to be. On the contrary, their desire is to continue to operate as independent 
businessmen, free from such controls as an employer might exercise.186 
The issuance of the injunction did not therefore violate the NLA because the 
fish sellers were not employees, a condition precedent to establishment of a labor 
dispute under the NLA. Certain important implications flow from the foregoing 
passage. Had the underlying dispute been one in which the putative independent 
contractors sought to be employees, or had the independent contractors 
contended that they were in fact employees, the dispute might have fallen within 
the NLA’s definition of labor dispute.187 Strictly read, the passage also suggests 
 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Columbia River Packers Ass’n v. Hinton, 315 U.S. at 145. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 144–45. 
 185. Hinton v. Columbia River Packers Ass’n, 117 F.2d 310, 313 (9th Cir. 1941). 
 186. Columbia River Packers Ass’n v. Hinton, 315 U.S. at 147. 
 187. As will be explained in the next Part, whether workers’ actions are regulated by antitrust 
law is closely related to whether worker conduct is subject to injunction notwithstanding the 
contours of the NLA. Employee status thus bears on whether concerted action is exempted from 
the Sherman Antitrust Act and also whether the same concerted activity is an NLA-cognizable 
“labor dispute.” Professor Paul has argued that a minor exception to antitrust law’s regulation of 
non-employee concerted action applies to “independent contractor workers who are organizing 
specifically toward employee status, not those who are engaging in concerted action to directly 
better their conditions, or for other purposes” and that “organizing specifically for improved wages 
and working conditions ought to be within the scope of this exception, so long as employee status 
is also among the aims (under the test that the dispute must relate to terms and conditions of 
employment).” Paul, supra note 48, at 1033, n.240. 
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that had the independent contractors been the employees of “any other 
employer” the dispute might have been brought within the NLA. Columbia River 
Packers provides clues to the kinds of arguments that putative non-employee 
workers might make in an attempt to insulate themselves from federal 
injunctions. Chief among these arguments may be that non-employee workers 
should always explicitly contest their non-employee status while they are 
protesting the merits of the underlying workplace dispute. This might position 
them to argue the proposition such as that “[t]he term ‘labor dispute’ must not 
be narrowly construed,” and that “the employer-employee relationship [is] the 
matrix of the controversy,” a broad reading of the term followed by the Supreme 
Court in Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc. v. International Longshoremen’s 
Association.188 
Other cases seem to narrow the labor dispute definition, in tension with 
Jacksonville Bulk Terminals’ broad reading of Columbia River Packers. In 
Taylor v. Local No. 7, International Union of Journeymen Horseshoers,189 for 
example, the Fourth Circuit reversed a federal district court’s finding that certain 
horseshoers—also known as farriers—were employees.190 Somewhat unusually, 
the circuit court itself analyzed the job functions of the workers that were at 
issue.191 Having concluded that the farriers and horse trainers and owners did 
not stand in the relation of employer and employee, the court next considered 
the defendant-workers’ alternative argument that, even if the workers were 
independent contractors, they were nevertheless engaged in a “labor dispute” as 
defined under the NLA.192  
The only interests sought to be advanced by the activities of these defendants 
are the interests of those independent horseshoers who render services to trainers 
and owners for a certain fee, unilaterally fixed, per horse. They are independent 
businessmen, specialists in their line, who have banded together and who act in 
concert for their mutual benefit and improvement. We fail to discover the 
existence of any employer-employee relationship which is the ‘matrix’ of this 
controversy or any condition which, under the provisions of either the Clayton 
Act or the Norris-LaGuardia Act, would protect the activities of the 
defendants.193 
Despite the paucity of authority since Columbia River Packers touching on 
the question of application of the NLA to non-employee workers, the broad 
definition of labor dispute counseled by Jacksonville Bulk Terminals has been 
 
 188. 457 U.S. 702, 712–13 (1982) (quoting Columbia River Packers Ass’n v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 
at 147). 
 189. 353 F.2d 593, 593 (4th Cir. 1965). 
 190. Id. at 601, 606. 
 191. Id. at 599–600. 
 192. Id. at 602. 
 193. Id. at 606. 
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broadly embraced by the federal courts.194 It is difficult to locate any narrowing 
authority. Although it would be unwise for independent contractors, Gig 
workers, or other actual or putative non-employees to enter into a dispute with 
their “employing” entity without appreciating the potential for federal court 
injunctions, it also seems clear that the NLA is likely to be interpreted broadly, 
diminishing, at least, the risk of that outcome. 
1. Work Stoppages and Antitrust 
When independent contractors or other non-employee workers engage in 
work stoppages, they run the risk of violating antitrust law.195 The Sherman 
Antitrust Act states that, “[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or 
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several 
States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.”196 Although this 
language is on the surface broad enough to encompass traditional labor activity, 
federal law has historically—though not without repeated struggles197—
exempted such activity from the Sherman Act.198 Those exemptions, however, 
do not apply to non-employee workers when deemed independent businesses.199 
Despite legislative history that antitrust law was never meant to apply to 
combinations of workers,200 the number of non-employee workers has been 
expanding through operation of the Gig economy, thus bringing these new 
“combinations” to the edge of the black hole that is antitrust.201 When non-
 
 194. The Court has observed that “the statutory definition itself is extremely broad,” Brady v. 
N.F.L., 644 F.3d 661, 671 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, Inc., 457 U.S. at 
712). “Congress made the definition broad because it wanted it to be broad.” Brady, 644 F.3d at 
671 (quoting Order of R.R. Teleg. v. Chicago & N. W. R. Co. 362 U.S. 330, 335–36 (1960). The 
courts have also demonstrated the continued broad reach of the NLA by rebuffing efforts by 
railroad employers to escape the NLA by obtaining injunctions to suppress secondary labor activity 
by railroad unions. (Unlike the NLRA, the Railway Labor Act provides courts with no secondary 
boycott injunctive authority). Burlington N. R. Co. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emp., 481 U.S. 429, 
451, 453 (1987); Richmond, Fredericksburg and Potomac R. Co. v. Bhd. of Maint. of Way Emp., 
795 F.2d 1161, 1165 (4th Cir. 1986). 
 195. Sandeep Vaheesan, Accommodating Capital and Policing Labor: Antitrust in the Two 
Gilded Ages, 78 MD. L. REV. 766, 793 (2019) (arguing that since the 1970s, federal courts “have 
renounced the congressional goals of the antitrust laws and held that the only appropriate objective 
is the promotion of economic efficiency or consumer welfare”). 
 196. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2019). 
 197. Marshall Steinbaum, Antitrust, the Gig Economy, and Labor Market Power, 82 LAW AND 
CONTEMP. PROB. 45, 58 (2019). 
 198. See Cal. ex rel. Harris, supra note 46. 
 199. Paul, supra note 48, at1030. 
 200. Vaheesan, supra note 195, at 779–783. 
 201. Id. at 809–810 (“Given employers’ increasing classification—and misclassification—of 
workers as independent contractors across the economy, the Clayton Act’s exemption for labor, as 
currently interpreted, provides many workers with no protection from antitrust investigations and 
lawsuits.”) 
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employee workers—if considered independent businesses—agitate concertedly 
for improvements in working conditions, they may become subject to antitrust 
sanctions, which is a serious matter because under antitrust law, 
Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or 
conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, 
on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if 
a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not 
exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the 
court.202  
It will be recalled that a number of the older cases discussing NLA injunctive 
authority arose in antitrust contexts in which it was alleged that antitrust 
violations should be enjoined.203 A close connection therefore exists with 
respect to the employment relation for purposes both of establishing NLA 
jurisdiction and opening the door to substantive and injunctive relief under 
antitrust law. In short, work stoppages by non-employee workers may be 
unprotected by the NLA and sanctionable under antitrust law.204 
Even statutory employees may be derivatively subject to antitrust risk. In 
recent years, some employees have acted under the aegis of worker centers and 
other “alt-labor” groups.205 There is a serious question as to whether these 
groups fall under antitrust law’s safe harbor for labor activity.206 One case has 
(frighteningly) held that under antitrust law, the existence of a labor organization 
 
 202. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2019). 
 203. See e.g. 180 Colum. River Packers Ass’n v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143, 145 (1942). 
 204. 15 U.S.C. § 25, provides for antitrust injunctions sought by the Government. The section 
gives U.S. District Courts jurisdiction to prevent and restrain violations of the antitrust laws and 
directs U.S. Attorneys, under the supervision of the Attorney General, to file actions seeking to 
prevent and restrain the violations. 15 U.S.C. § 26 authorizes “any person, firm, corporation, or 
association” to seek injunctive relief against threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust 
laws. Private parties may also seek injunctive relief under 15 U.S.C. § 26. See Merit Motors, Inc. 
v. Chrysler Corp., 569 F.2d 666, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1977). 
 205. See Josh Eidelson, Alt-Labor, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (Jan. 29, 2013), https://prospect. 
org/notebook/alt-labor. 
 206. 15 U.S.C. § 17 states: 
The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. Nothing contained 
in the antitrust laws shall be construed to forbid the existence and operation of labor, 
agricultural, or horticultural organizations, instituted for the purposes of mutual help, and 
not having capital stock or conducted for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members 
of such organizations from lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall 
such organizations, or the members thereof, be held or construed to be illegal combinations 
or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the antitrust laws. 
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is a fact question for a jury.207 Though this seems somewhat doubtful given the 
law of the NLRA,208 Jeffrey Hirsch and Joseph Seiner have cautioned, 
Among the potential disadvantages of nontraditional groups—and the most 
significant from a financial and criminal perspective—is antitrust law. Perhaps 
no issue better represents the knife’s edge facing nontraditional groups, which 
must carefully monitor whether their actions may constitute anticompetitive 
behavior under antitrust law and, if so, whether they will enjoy protection under 
the antitrust labor exception. This task is made all the more difficult by the 
opacity of antitrust law as it applies to nontraditional labor efforts.209 
If alt-labor groups are not “labor organizations” within the meaning of the 
NLRA, their participation in various worker concerted activities may be deemed 
a “conspiracy in restraint of trade” in violation of antitrust law, with employee-
members vulnerable as “co-conspirators.”210 
Ultimately, as Marshall Steinbaum has put it, if the only objective of 
antitrust law is lower prices for consumers, then “collective action by port 
truckers, home health aides, church organists, or gig economy workers is 
inefficient rent-seeking.”211 While a full discussion of the interplay between 
antitrust and labor law is beyond the scope of this article, the narrow question 
here is whether all non-employee work stoppages must boil down to unlawful 
“rent seeking” under the Sherman Act. Returning to the protesting, independent 
contractor-heavy Google workers, for example, the concerted activity in 
question was a complicated affair. First, the group may have consisted of both 
employee and non-employee workers because Google is a “mixed” work 
force.212 If the Google workers had consisted exclusively of non-employee 
independent contractors, however, the question would be whether a work 
 
 207. Ring v. Spina, 84 F. Supp. 403, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 1949). Frightening because a non-employee 
worker could be liable under antitrust through affiliation with a non-labor group the worker could 
not have known in advance was not protected by the antitrust labor exemption. 
 208. 29 U.S.C. § 152(5) defines “labor organization” as “any organization of any kind, or any 
agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which employees participate and which 
exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor 
disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.” (Emphases supplied). 
 209. Jeffrey M. Hirsch & Joseph A. Seiner, A Modern Union for the Modern Economy, 86 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1727, 1776 (2018). 
 210. Tex. Indus. Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 634–38 (1981) (discussing 
difficult problems of liability allocation given potentially very large classes of co-conspirators). 
 211. Id. at 59; see also Vaheesan, supra note 195, at 793 (arguing that since the 1970s federal 
courts “have renounced the congressional goals of the antitrust laws and held that the only 
appropriate objective is the promotion of economic efficiency or consumer welfare”). Obviously, 
had this historically been the only policy cognizable under antitrust law, the general labor law 
exemption could never have come into existence. 
 212. Mark Bergen and Ellen Huet, The Secret and Frustrating Life of a Google Contract 
Worker, LOS ANGELES TIMES (Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.latimes.com/business/technology/story 
/2019-11-08/the-secret-and-frustrating-life-of-a-google-contract-worker. 
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stoppage over sexual harassment could implicate antitrust law. One should 
distinguish here between non-employee work stoppages aimed at “protest” and 
those aimed at affecting remuneration in a way that might lead to diminished 
consumer welfare in the form of higher prices—admittedly a narrow view of 
that welfare.213 Increased remuneration to independent contractors seems 
rationally connected to increased consumer prices.  
In Federal Trade Commission v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers 
Association,214 a group of lawyers agreed not to represent indigent criminal 
defendants in the District of Columbia Superior Court until the District of 
Columbia government (which was not their employer) increased the lawyers’ 
compensation.215 The ensuing boycott216 was completely successful.217 The 
Court stated that “[t]he agreement among the lawyers was designed to obtain 
higher prices for their services and was implemented by a concerted refusal to 
serve an important customer in the market for legal services and, indeed, the 
only customer in the market for the particular services that [the lawyers] 
offered.”218 The Court characterized the lawyers’ conduct as “the essence of 
price-fixing,” and concluded that “[t]he horizontal arrangement among these 
 
 213. This point does not seek to lend credence to the questionable primacy afforded “consumer 
welfare” to the exclusion of all other social goods. The executive branch and judiciary “have 
replaced congressional (and once-judicially validated) economic and political objectives with an 
‘efficiency’ or ‘consumer welfare’ goal.” See Vaheesan, supra note 195, at 769. The point here is 
that, even taking the consumer welfare arguments at face value, there must still be some articulable 
linkage between collective activity and consumer harm. 
 214. 493 U.S. 411 (1990). 
 215. Id. at 414. 
 216. The dictionary definition of boycott is “the process or an instance of joining with others 
in refusing to deal with someone (as a person, organization, or country) as a way of protesting or 
forcing changes.” MERRIAM WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/. 
Specialized definitions of the term under federal labor law are beyond the scope of this discussion. 
 217. See Sup. Ct. Trial Law. Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 418. Within two weeks the involved lawyers’ 
rates were increased from $30 per hour for court time and $20 per hour for out-of-court time to a 
temporary $35 per hour rate to a subsequent permanent increase to $45 an hour for out-of-court 
time and $55 for in-court time. Id. at 416–418. 
 218. Id. at 422–23 (internal citations omitted). 
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competitors was unquestionably a ‘naked restraint’219 on price and output.”220 
The rule of Trial Lawyers as applied to independent contractors engaging in 
work stoppages for higher remuneration creates a seemingly bright line: 
regardless of one’s views of the broad fictitiousness of independent contractor 
designations throughout much of the economy, under current antitrust law, 
independent contractors risk work stoppages being designated by courts as 
illegal boycotts.221 For worker advocates, the remedy to the problem will 
ultimately be pushing for amended statutory employee definitions across the 
economy to make misclassification of employees as independent contractors 
significantly more difficult.222 
Antitrust scrutiny may appear irrelevant in cases of “pure” protest work 
stoppages, for example against Google for sexual harassment; or irrelevant in 
connection with safety-related work stoppages like those emerging from 
 
 219. In other words, the conduct was a “per se” violation of the antitrust laws. 
Violations under the Sherman Act take one of two forms – either as a per se violation or as 
a violation of the rule of reason. Section 1 of the Sherman Act characterizes certain business 
practices as per se violations. A per se violation requires no further inquiry into the 
practice’s actual effect on the market or the intentions of those individuals who engaged in 
the practice. Some business practices, however, at times constitute anticompetitive behavior 
and at other times encourage competition within the market. For these cases, the court 
applies a “totality of the circumstances test” and asks whether the challenged practice 
promotes or suppresses market competition. Courts often find intent and motive relevant in 
predicting future consequences during a rule of reason analysis. 
CORNELL LAW SCHOOL, LII, ANTITRUST, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/antitrust [https://per 
ma.cc/K72W-7XN6]. 
 220. See Sup. Ct. Trial Law. Ass’n, 493 U.S. at 423. 
 221. Id. See also Paul, supra note 48, at 1043 (describing “Trial Lawyers as an instance of the 
neoclassical price-fixing logic applied to worker collective action that looms as a serious threat, if 
not an outright blockade, to much nontraditional worker organizing, particularly on the part of 
independent contractor workers not affiliated with a traditional labor organization”). 
 222. In a bill passed by the House of Representatives in February 2020, the NLRA would be 
amended as follows:  
“An individual performing any service shall be considered an employee (except as provided 
in the previous sentence) and not an independent contractor, unless. . . (A) the individual is 
free from control and direction in connection with the performance of the service, both 
under the contract for the performance of service and in fact; (B) the service is performed 
outside the usual course of the business of the employer; and (C) the individual is 
customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, profession, or 
business of the same nature as that involved in the service performed.” 
H.R. 2474, 116th Cong. (1st Sess. 2019) https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-
bill/2474/text [https://perma.cc/282E-Y7PE]. This statutory criteria, known as the “ABC test,” has 
been embraced by a number of states in various employment contexts, most notably under 
California law. See Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Super. Ct., 416 P.3d 1, 35, 39 (Cal. 2018) 
(holding that a putative employer suffers or permits a putative employee to work if it cannot 
overcome three-part test for classifying workers as independent contractors). 
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COVID-19 contexts.223 A logical first reaction to the question might be that 
workers engaging in the Google protest, for example, should not have been liable 
under antitrust law because the work stoppage contained elements of speech or 
expressive content.224 As has been known throughout the history of labor law, 
work stoppages often involve picketing or other attempts to communicate the 
facts of a “labor” dispute and attempts to suppress the communication have 
routinely drawn First Amendment scrutiny.225 It might be argued that parallel 
scrutiny should be undertaken in the context of application of antitrust liability 
to non-employee work stoppages—indeed, this article will make this argument. 
As Sanjukta Paul has shown, however, this First Amendment theory was dealt a 
blow in Trial Lawyers.226 There, the Court distinguished its storied opinion in 
Claiborne Hardware by drawing a bright line between concerted boycotts (like 
work stoppages) for one’s own advantage and those motivated by “the equal 
respect and equal treatment to which [participants] were constitutionally 
entitled.”227 Trial Lawyers continued that the racial justice boycott in Claiborne 
“was not intended ‘to destroy legitimate competition.’ . . . Equality and freedom 
are preconditions of the free market, and not commodities to be haggled over 
within it.”228 This nice phrase does nothing to clarify how its principle would 
apply in practice to, for example, the Google work stoppage. A protest against 
sexual harassment potentially seeks both personal advantage (to be personally 
free of sexual harassment) and the collective good of ridding the workplace of 
sexual harassment, both “preconditions of the free market, and not commodities 
to be haggled over within it.”229 
Safety protests are similarly problematic. During the COVID-19 pandemic, 
several news stories suggested that Instacart230 workers were “striking” or 
 
 223. It is worth repeating that the issue in these scenarios is not whether workers are statutorily 
protected—assuming arguendo a finding of non-employee status under relevant statutes they would 
not be; rather, the question remains whether workers could be liable for such work stoppages under 
antitrust law. 
 224. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 911–912 (1982) (reversing on First 
Amendment grounds the Mississippi Supreme Court’s opinion upholding lower courts’ imposition 
of tort and state antitrust damages on various defendants participating in economic boycott of white 
merchants to pressure for racial and civil rights in Claiborne County, Mississippi). 
 225. See generally Carlson v. Cal., 310 U.S. 106, 110–111 (1940). 
 226. Paul, supra note 48, at 1043 (arguing throughout that “an artificial distinction between the 
‘economic’ and the ‘political’ keeps First Amendment protection for a classic workers’ boycott at 
bay.”) 
 227. Fed. Trade Comm’n Superior Lawyers Assoc., 493 U.S. at 426. 
 228. Id. at 426–27. 
 229. Id. 
 230. According to Instacart’s web site, “[Its] services comprise a platform that presents you 
with a set of one or more retailer virtual storefronts from which you can select goods for picking, 
packing, and delivery by individual personal shoppers (‘Personal Shoppers’) to your location or, if 
available, for you to pick up in-store. Picking, packing, or delivery services may be performed by 
third parties including a retailer or third-party logistics provider (collectively, ‘Third Party 
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preparing to do so.231 One New York publication reporting on the story inquired, 
“Is it really a strike if Instacart workers aren’t employees?”232 According to 
published reports, Instacart, which was already operating in 5500 cities in North 
America, planned to “hire 300,000 ‘full-service shoppers,’ who are treated as 
independent contractors, in North America over the next three months due to 
increased demand spurred by the coronavirus pandemic. That would more than 
double its current workforce of full-service shoppers.”233 
When the potential exists for hundreds of thousands of Instacart workers 
“striking” over both “hazard pay” and, for example, provision of personal 
protective equipment, a very difficult antitrust problem is presented that plainly 
differs in scope from antitrust disputes involving pockets of professional or trade 
workers that the Federal Trade Commission has occasionally prosecuted or 
found problematic under antitrust law.234 The “independent businessperson” 
model seems both inaccurate and wholly inadequate in assessing this broad 
Instacart/Gig economy problem. First, the independent businessperson model 
seems factually inaccurate. It is simply difficult to accept the often-repeated 
mantra that businesses like Instacart are “technology companies” only 
incidentally involved in any particular industry.235 It further strains the credulity 
 
Providers’).” INSTACART TERMS OF SERVICE https://www.instacart.com/terms [https://perma.cc 
/V69K-HCKC] (last visited Jan. 12, 2021). 
 231. See Erik Ortiz, Some Instacart workers strike, others demand more as coronavirus alters 
labor landscape, NBC NEWS (Mar. 30, 2020), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/some-
instacart-workers-strike-others-demand-more-coronavirus-alters-labor-n1171521 [https://perma. 
cc/manage/create?folder=7821]; Alexandra Olson and Mae Anderson, Some Instacart, Amazon 
Workers Strike as Jobs Get Riskier, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Mar. 31, 2020), 
https://www.usnews.com/news/business/articles/2020-03-30/some-instacart-amazon-workers-
strike-as-jobs-get-riskier. 
 232. Samantha Christmann, Is it Really a Strike if Instacart Workers Aren’t Employees?, THE 
BUFFALO NEWS (Mar. 30, 2020) https://buffalonews.com/2020/03/30/is-it-really-a-strike-if-insta 
cart-workers-arent-employees/./ [https://perma.cc/78DT-KWQC.]. 
 233. Sara Ashley O’Brien, Instacart Plans to Hire 300,000 More Workers as Demand Surges 
for Grocery Deliveries, CNN (Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/03/23/tech/instacart-
hiring/index.html. [https://perma.cc/2DBZ-3RQG]. 
 234. Vaheesan, supra note 195, at 810–13 (explaining that FTC has pursued and enforced 
antitrust law against animal breeders, electricians, ice skating teachers, managers of commercial 
and residential properties, music teachers, organists, public defenders [twice] and has investigated 
truck drivers at several ports for seeking to organize for higher wages, reduced hours, and improved 
working conditions). The actions appear to share in common some attempt by the involved groups 
to improve remuneration. 
 235. Jacob Rosenberg, Gig Workers Are More Undervalued Than Ever Before. Tech 
Companies Are Spending Like Crazy to Keep It That Way, MOTHER JONES (May/June 2020), 
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2020/04/gig-workers-are-more-undervalued-than-ever-be 
fore-tech-companies-are-spending-like-crazy-to-keep-it-that-way/ [https://perma.cc/DV65-WH 
FG] (“For their part, gig companies are doubling down on their opposition to [newly amended 
California employment law], which dared to question one of the tenets of Silicon Valley: A business 
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to accept that Instacart is comprised of hundreds of thousands of independent 
businesspeople who might have come together on their own, but have done so 
more efficiently through the serendipitous intervention of an “app.”236 
Furthermore, applying the independent businessperson model of antitrust law to 
safety-related work stoppages seems legally inadequate: it does not seem 
compelled under the logic of cases like Trial Lawyers, or even much older cases 
like Apex Hosiery v. Leader;237 and it certainly does not respond to the looming 
and muddling problem of a multiplicity of employee definitions throughout the 
economy (though this is a criticism also applying to remuneration-based work 
stoppages): as mentioned previously, one may be an employee in California but 
not an employee under the National Labor Relations Board definition.238 Courts 
should be very hesitant about imposing severe antitrust sanctions where the 
statutory predicates for liability—here, the employee definition—are vague. As 
Justice Gorsuch said recently in his concurrence in Sessions v. Dimaya,239 fair 
notice of the law’s demands is required under the Constitution.240 Justice 
Gorsuch has also opined that “void for vagueness” concerns arise in civil no less 
than criminal contexts, 
[C]ivil laws regularly impose penalties far more severe than those found in many 
criminal statutes . . . Ours is a world filled with more and more civil laws bearing 
more and more extravagant punishments. Today’s ‘civil’ penalties include 
confiscatory rather than compensatory fines, forfeiture provisions that allow 
homes to be taken, remedies that strip persons of their professional licenses and 
 
is not defined by the service it provides but by its technology—its platform.”); see also O’Connor 
v. Uber Tech., Inc., 82 F.Supp.3d 1133, 1141 (N.D. Cal. 2015) 
(“Uber is no more a ‘technology company’ than Yellow Cab is a ‘technology company’ 
because it uses CB radios to dispatch taxi cabs, John Deere is a ‘technology company’ 
because it uses computers and robots to manufacture lawn mowers, or Domino Sugar is a 
‘technology company’ because it uses modern irrigation techniques to grow its sugar cane. 
Indeed, very few (if any) firms are not technology companies if one focuses solely on how 
they create or distribute their products. If, however, the focus is on the substance of what 
the firm actually does (e.g., sells cab rides, lawn mowers, or sugar), it is clear that Uber is 
most certainly a transportation company, albeit a technologically sophisticated one.”) 
 236. Katy Steinmetz, Lawsuit Claims Instacart ‘Personal Shoppers’ Should Be Classified as 
Employees, TIME (Mar. 18, 2015), https://time.com/3748438/instacart-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc 
/ZGU5-5FU2] (quoting plaintiff’s argument: “[There is] this narrative that I think companies like 
Instacart and Uber and Lyft want to become more mainstream . . . that somehow these antiquated 
laws don’t apply to these types of work relationships. And frankly it’s ludicrous. Just because a 
worker is directed and controlled by an algorithm that comes through a phone as opposed to a 
foreman doesn’t do anything to change the fundamental relationship of employment.”). 
 237. 310 U.S. 469 (1940). 
 238. See WEIL, supra note 153; 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1), 163; see NATIONAL LABOR 
RELATIONS BOARD, THE RIGHT TO STRIKE, http://www.nlrb.gov/strikes [https://perma.cc/5L2P-
6U3B.] (last visited Jan. 12, 2021). 
 239. 138 S.Ct. 1204 (2018). 
 240. Id. at 1228. 
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livelihoods, and the power to commit persons against their will indefinitely. 
Some of these penalties are routinely imposed and are routinely graver than 
those associated with misdemeanor crimes—and often harsher than the 
punishment for felonies. And not only are ‘punitive civil sanctions . . . rapidly 
expanding,’ they are ‘sometimes more severely punitive than the parallel 
criminal sanctions for the same conduct.’241 
Given the civil and criminal severity of antitrust penalties, heightening the 
stakes of independent contractor misclassification beyond that which might be 
encountered in other areas of law, and the increasing ambiguity of the employee 
definition under federal and state law, the application of antitrust liability to 
ordinary citizens should give courts great pause.242 
If an arrangement of “independent businesspersons” is found to be a 
violation of the Sherman Act, liability for individuals who are employees under 
state law seems problematic. In First Amendment contexts, “[f]or liability to be 
imposed by reason of association alone, it is necessary to establish that the group 
itself possessed unlawful goals and that the individual held a specific intent to 
further those illegal aims.”243 A court must judge this intent “according to the 
strictest law.”244 It would be hard to derive intent to violate antitrust law from a 
worker’s good faith belief that she possessed employee status and was therefore 
exempted from a duty to comply with antitrust law. Of course, this presupposes 
the existence of a First Amendment problem. Some expressive or associative 
interest must accompany the work stoppage. Outside the context of independent 
contractor work stoppages for improvements in remuneration, however, Trial 
Lawyers does not deny First Amendment protection of all non-employee 
concerted action (including work stoppages).245 This antitrust liability limitation 
is consistent with the Court’s older opinion in Apex Hosiery v. Leader:  
…that [conduct] activities of labor organizations not immunized by the Clayton 
Act are not necessarily violations of the Sherman Act. Underlying and implicit 
in all of them is recognition that the Sherman Act was not enacted to police 
interstate transportation, or to afford a remedy for wrongs, which are actionable 
under state law, and result from combinations and conspiracies which fall short, 
both in their purpose and effect, of any form of market control of a commodity, 
such as to “monopolize the supply, control its price, or discriminate between its 
would-be purchasers.”246 
Antitrust law is not, in other words, a generic enforcer of commerce wrongs. 
At all events, First Amendment interpretive difficulties in this area should be 
 
 241. Id. at 1229 (internal citations omitted). 
 242. See Steinbaum, supra note 197, at 57. 
 243. Barnes Found. v. Twp. of Lower Merion, 242 F.3d 151, 163 (3d Cir. 2001) (citing 
Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 920 (emphasis added)). 
 244. Id. (quoting Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 919). 
 245. See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 911–912. 
 246. Apex Hosiery v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 512 (1940). 
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avoided. As the Supreme Court reaffirmed in Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. 
Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,247 a labor speech case in which the 
Court declined to find peaceful, but arguably “secondary,” union leafletting 
unlawful under the NLRA, “where an otherwise acceptable construction of a 
statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the 
statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the 
intent of Congress.”248 Similarly, in the context of work stoppages by non-
employees—particularly where the stoppages contain strong expressive 
components, seek workplace safety, and do not directly seek an increase in 
remuneration—courts have no good reason to aggravate statutory antitrust 
vagueness or risk running afoul of the First Amendment in service of a volatile 
Gig economy that Congress could not possibly have foreseen during its 
deliberations on the Sherman Act.  
III.  THE POTENTIAL IMPACT OF PRIVATE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS ON 
WORK STOPPAGES 
Returning to the realm of employees rather than non-employee workers, the 
article now discusses the potential impact of private arbitration on the right of 
non-union employees to engage in work stoppages. In American labor law—the 
body of labor relations law applicable to unionized workplaces249—the 
resolution of labor disputes through arbitration has occupied an almost hallowed 
position.250 Under the Steelworkers’ Trilogy,251 arbitration is a matter of 
collective bargaining agreements and the parties—employers and unions—need 
not arbitrate unless they have agreed to do so;252 courts, not arbitrators, decide 
whether parties have agreed to arbitrate, unless the parties clearly and 
unmistakably provide otherwise.253 Arbitrators, not courts, decide underlying 
claims on their merits under applicable collective bargaining agreements, even 
if those claims appear frivolous to a given court; and if collective bargaining 
agreements contain arbitration clauses, particular employment disputes are 
presumed arbitrable.254 Arbitration is not to be denied unless an arbitration 
clause positively cannot be interpreted as covering a dispute. In other words, 
 
 247. 485 U.S. 568 (1988). 
 248. Id. at 575. 
 249. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2018) 
 250. See generally Benjamin Aaron, Judicial Intervention in Labor Arbitration, 20 STAN. L. 
REV. 41 (1967). 
 251. Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 
363 U.S. 574 (1960); Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 US 593 (1960). 
 252. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U. S. at 577–78, 582; Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S .at 566, 568. 
 253. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U.S. at 582–583. See Operating Engineers v. Flair Builders, Inc., 
406 U.S. 487, 491 (1972); Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co., 370 U. S. 238, 241 (1962), overruled 
in part on other grounds, Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerk’s Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). 
 254. Am. Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. at 568–69 (footnote omitted). 
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doubts are resolved in favor of coverage.255 Where unions and employers have 
entered into collective bargaining agreements containing grievance-arbitration 
provisions, the NLRB does not, absent unusual circumstances, investigate cases 
alleging violations of the NLRA, either before or after an arbitration over the 
dispute.256 Although these NLRB arbitration-deferral rules slightly change from 
time-to-time depending on the political makeup of the NLRB,257 the general 
outline, which is applicable only in unionized workplaces governed by collective 
bargaining agreements with a grievance process culminating in binding 
arbitration, has never been successfully challenged.258 
Another longstanding principle of labor law is that “bargaining unit”259 
employees may not lawfully engage in work stoppages if the collective 
bargaining agreement governing their workplace forbids it under a “no strike” 
pledge.260 Assuming that an underlying work dispute is arbitrable under a 
collective bargaining agreement, violation of the no-strike pledge, thereby 
evading arbitration, renders the work stoppage subject to federal court 
injunction.261 When issued, such injunctions typically both suspend the work 
stoppage and compel arbitration of the underlying dispute.262 Furthermore, the 
general rule is that, where a work dispute is arbitrable, a pledge not to engage in 
a work stoppage over the dispute is implied.263 
However, the arbitral principles just discussed do not, and could not, apply 
outside of a unionized workplace because they presume the existence of a 
collective bargaining agreement between an employer and a recognized, or 
certified, exclusive representative of a majority of the employer’s employees.264 
In that very specific context there are a set of policy rationales justifying 
 
 255. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U.S. at 582–83. 
 256. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B 837, 841–42 (1971); Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 
N.L.R.B 1080, 1081–82 (1955). 
 257. See Memorandum GC 19-03 from General Counsel of N.L.R.B (December 28, 2018). 
 258. See AT&T Tech., Inc. v. Commc’ns Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986). 
 259. The parties to a collective bargaining agreement are an employer and a union representing 
a bargaining unit—or legally permissible and selected or designated grouping of employees—in a 
carefully defined workplace. Saipan Hotel Corp. v. NLRB, 114 F.3d 994, 998 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(noting that Board unit determinations are based on common interest of employees and are rarely 
to be disturbed). 
 260. Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235, 237–38, 248–49 (1970). 
 261. Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 405 (1976). 
 262. Id. at 405–06, 407-08, 412–13 (declining to issue injunction for violation of a no strike 
provision where it was unclear that strike was motivated by an arbitrable grievance). 
 263. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 414 U.S. 368, 381 (1974) (“[A] 
contractual commitment to submit disagreements to final and binding arbitration gives rise to an 
implied obligation not to strike over such disputes.”) (citing Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour, 
369 U.S. 95, 105 (1962)). 
 264. Int’l Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 737 (1961) (“In their 
selection of a bargaining representative, § 9(a) of the Wagner Act guarantees employees freedom 
of choice and majority rule.”) (internal citations omitted). 
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enforcement of no-strike pledges in favor of arbitration. First, the courts “went 
a long way towards making arbitration the central institution in the 
administration of collective bargaining contracts.”265 Next, “the unavailability 
of equitable relief [i.e., injunctions] in the arbitration context [would present] a 
serious impediment to the congressional policy favoring the voluntary 
establishment of a mechanism for the peaceful resolution of labor disputes[.]”266 
Given the cabining of these rules in the NLRA context, it may not be apparent 
what they could possibly have to do with this section’s focus on the rights of 
non-union employees. Simply put, there is reason to think that some of these 
labor arbitration principles could be exported to non-union employment 
arbitration. 
According to the Current Population Study of the Bureau of Census for the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 6.2% of private sector employees in the United States 
are union members, while 7.1% of private sector employees are covered by a 
collective bargaining agreement.267 In 1973, very close in time to when Boy’s 
Markets was decided,268 union membership in the United States stood at about 
24%. Paralleling this retrogression, work stoppages at large employers began 
declining in the mid-1970s, and strikes at both large and small companies peaked 
in the late 1980s and underwent a sharp decline thereafter.269 Thus, the overall 
risk of work stoppages seemed to have been declining until recently, when the 
number of work stoppages began trending upwards.270 In other words, present 
day union density continues to be very low while work stoppages seem to be 
increasing. 
As the foregoing trend has been unfolding, the number of non-union 
employees covered by private arbitration agreements has simultaneously been 
accelerating rapidly. As John Bickerman recently wrote, 
In 1992, the year after the initial Supreme Court arbitration ruling [applying the 
Federal Arbitration Act to employment contracts], the percentage of employees 
subject to arbitration stood at two percent. By the early 2000’s, that percentage 
had risen to almost a quarter of the non-union workforce. Drawing upon a 
nationally representative sample of non-union employers from a survey . . ., 
mandatory arbitration now covers 56 percent of the non-union labor force. And 
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among employers with 1,000 or more employees, a staggering almost two-
thirds, or 65.1 percent, of companies have given their employees no option but 
to adjudicate their claims before an arbitrator. Translated to the non-union labor 
force, over 60 million workers in non-union private sector jobs have been denied 
access to the courts, where research has shown their claims would fare better 
than in arbitration.271 
The rapid growth of non-union arbitration at first blush has nothing to do 
with the policies of the NLRA. Yet, a primary objective of labor law is the 
elimination of industrial strife.272 Arbitration is a favored means under federal 
labor law to achieve that objective.273 What happens when the non-union sector 
of the economy decreases in size? What happens when the use of arbitration in 
the workplace increases? Industrial strife is being experienced in non-union 
workplaces and private arbitration could be utilized to reduce the strife. From 
each of those premises, it seems a short step for courts to insist that non-union 
employees be held to their bargain to resolve work disputes through arbitration 
rather than through work stoppages. Such a freedom-of-contract principle 
guided the Supreme Court’s opinion in Boy’s Markets.274  
Consistent with this principle, the Supreme Court has even previously 
enforced arbitration agreements in which unions and employers agreed that 
bargaining unit members must arbitrate non-NLRA statutory claims.275 More 
recently, in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis,276 the Supreme Court stated that § 7 of 
the National Labor Relations Act “does not express approval or disapproval of 
arbitration. It does not mention class or collective action procedures. It does not 
even hint at a wish to displace the Arbitration Act—let alone accomplish that 
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much clearly and manifestly, as our precedents demand.”277 The culmination of 
this logic might be that an individual employee under freedom of contract 
principles should be able to agree with an employer not to engage in a work 
stoppage. 
Consider the way in which the Court framed the issues at play in the three 
consolidated cases collectively making up Epic Systems: “Should employees and 
employers be allowed to agree that any disputes between them will be resolved 
through one-on-one arbitration? Or should employees always be permitted to 
bring their claims in class or collective actions, no matter what they agreed with 
their employers?”278 Why would that logic not apply to work stoppages, or to 
any collective right? The objection to that logic is merely reflexive: individual 
employees should not be compelled to arbitrate because they possess concerted 
rights to engage in work stoppages under the NLRA.279 However, the employees 
in Epic Systems appear to possess § 7 rights to concertedly bring grievances to 
their employers. Through the facility of the Federal Arbitration Act, the Court 
upheld the right of the employer to condition employment on waiver of 
collective rights. This seems very hard to distinguish from a Yellow Dog 
contract280 and its limiting principle is at best unclear. 
The NLRB, in a leading arbitration case pre-dating Epic Systems, grappled 
with similar problems with a strong focus upon its labor law expertise. In D.R. 
Horton, Inc.,281 a superintendent claimed that his employer had deprived him, 
and a class of similarly situated superintendents, of statutory protections under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act.282 When the superintendent’s counsel provided 
notice to the employer of an intent to file a class action suit in connection with 
the alleged FLSA violations, the employer’s counsel “replied that [the 
superintendent’s counsel] had failed to give an effective notice of intent to 
arbitrate, citing the language in the [involved arbitration agreement] that bars 
arbitration of collective claims.”283  
[The superintendent] filed an unfair labor practice charge, and the General 
Counsel issued a complaint alleging that the Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1) 
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by maintaining the [arbitration agreement] provision stating that the arbitrator 
“may hear only Employee’s individual claims and does not have the authority 
to fashion a proceeding as a class or collective action or to award relief to a 
group or class of employees in one arbitration proceeding.”284  
In finding a violation of the NLRA, the NLRB argued “[a]fter all, if the 
Respondent’s employees struck in order to induce the Respondent to comply 
with the FLSA, that form of concerted activity would clearly have been 
protected.”285 However, the critical issue in D.R. Horton was not whether the 
superintendents’ concerted litigation would otherwise have been protected under 
the NLRA; rather, the issue was whether finding restrictions on collective 
actions unlawful under the NLRA would conflict with the Federal Arbitration 
Act.286 
The NLRB argued in D.R. Horton that the collective industrial peace 
rationale was simply incompatible with the individual contract policies 
embedded in the Federal Arbitration Act—leaving to one side the large issue of 
whether those policies were ever meant to apply to employment contracts287—
and that the NLRA, enacted in 1935, impliedly repealed—as the more recent of 
the statutes—conflicting Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) policies enacted in 
1925.288 Justice Gorsuch, however, writing for the majority in Epic Systems, said 
“[t]he NLRA secures to employees rights to organize unions and bargain 
collectively, but it says nothing about how judges and arbitrators must try legal 
disputes that leave the workplace and enter the courtroom or arbitral forum.”289 
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Despite this cramped reading of § 7 of the NLRA,290 the statement does not on 
its surface threaten wholesale FAA invasion of the NLRA—it evokes images 
only of the mode of “trying” legal disputes in a courtroom-like setting. Justice 
Gorsuch’s opinion steadily becomes more alarming, however. In response to the 
argument that, even if employees’ rights to file grievances collectively—the 
precise issue in Epic Systems—do not directly involve employees’ rights to 
organize unions, they may involve the right of employees to engage in other 
“concerted activities for the purpose of [other] mutual aid or protection.”291 
Justice Gorsuch said: 
The employees direct our attention to the term “other concerted activities for the 
purpose of . . . other mutual aid or protection.” This catchall term, they say, can 
be read to include class and collective legal actions. But the term appears at the 
end of a detailed list of activities speaking of “self-organization,” “form[ing], 
join[ing], or assist[ing] labor organizations,” and “bargain[ing] collectively.” 
And where, as here, a more general term follows more specific terms in a list, 
the general term is usually understood to “‘embrace only objects similar in 
nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.’”292 
This alarming statement effectively cabins the collective rights of non-union 
employees to an unspecified degree. The “detailed list” of activities to which 
Justice Gorsuch referred apply effortlessly to union organizational activities, but 
not so effortlessly to non-union employee concerted activities of other types.293 
The challenge will be determining what else might lay outside of “form[ing], 
join[ing], or assist[ing] labor organizations,” and “bargain[ing] collectively.” 
Taken to one logical conclusion, it might be possible to conclude that 
“nonorganizational” non-union work stoppages are not on Justice Gorsuch’s list. 
If these work stoppages are not on the official list of protected activities, and if 
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it is the general policy of the United States to encourage industrial peace, it may 
be perfectly sensible to conclude that employers and employees, possessing 
freedom of contract, are free to agree that work disputes will be dealt with 
exclusively through arbitration and never through work stoppages. After all, it 
would be an “individual” agreement. Suppose an individual employee 
nonetheless engaged in a work stoppage in derogation of an agreement not to do 
so. One might appeal to the Norris-LaGuardia Act as preventing such a work 
stoppage from being enjoined. In Boys Markets, however, the Supreme Court 
adopted a Railway Labor Act holding in Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. 
Chicago River & Ind. R. Co.294 that, 
…a strike in violation of a statutory arbitration duty was not the type of situation 
to which the Norris-LaGuardia Act was responsive, that an important federal 
policy was involved in the peaceful settlement of disputes through the statutorily 
mandated arbitration procedure, that this important policy was imperiled if 
equitable remedies were not available to implement it, and hence that Norris-
LaGuardia’s policy of nonintervention by the federal courts should yield to the 
overriding interest in the successful implementation of the arbitration 
process.295 
The Supreme Court has, in other words, already crossed federal statutory lines 
to advance the peaceful settlement of disputes through arbitration. The court at 
one time strongly expressed that labor arbitration could not defeat the NLA’s 
protection of peaceful work stoppages from labor injunctions when it said:  
Nor can we agree with the argument made in this Court that the . . . 
[Steelworkers’ Trilogy296] requires us to reconsider and overrule the action of 
Congress in refusing to repeal or modify the controlling commands of the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act. To the extent that those cases relied upon the proposition 
that the arbitration process is “a kingpin of federal labor policy,” we think that 
proposition was founded not upon the policy predilections of this Court but upon 
what Congress said and did when it enacted s 301. Certainly, we cannot accept 
any suggestion which would undermine those cases by implying that the Court 
went beyond its proper power and itself “forged . . . a kingpin of federal labor 
policy” inconsistent with that section and its purpose. Consequently, we do not 
see how cases implementing the purpose of s 301 can be said to have freed this 
Court from its duty to give effect to the plainly expressed congressional purpose 
with regard to the continued application of the anti-injunction provisions of the 
Norris-LaGuardia Act.297 
A mere eight years later the Court swept that principle aside and allowed 
arbitration to overcome the NLA by authorizing courts to suspend peaceful work 
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stoppages in favor of labor arbitration.298 Once a private, individual employee 
agreement not to engage in work stoppages is deemed enforceable, the Norris-
LaGuardia Act may become irrelevant because the Federal Arbitration Act 
contains its own provisions to compel arbitration.299 
One might in the final analysis object that if an individual employee 
generally agreed to resolve disputes by arbitration but did not explicitly agree 
not to engage in work stoppages, a no work stoppage pledge could not be 
implied. In the domain of labor law, however, this argument was rejected; except 
in situations where the right to engage in a work stoppage is specifically 
reserved, a pledge to arbitrate is implied.300 
The foregoing argument requires a series of improbable leaps and bounds, 
but none of those leaps seem more improbable than the Supreme Court’s opinion 
in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp301 that applied the Federal 
Arbitration Act to employment law in the first place. As Justice Stevens wrote 
in his dissenting opinion in that case: 
When the FAA was passed in 1925, I doubt that any legislator who voted for it 
expected it to apply to statutory claims, to form contracts between parties of 
unequal bargaining power, or to the arbitration of disputes arising out of the 
employment relationship. In recent years, however, the Court “has effectively 
rewritten the statute”, and abandoned its earlier view that statutory claims were 
not appropriate subjects for arbitration . . . Although I remain persuaded that it 
erred in doing so, the Court has also put to one side any concern about the 
inequality of bargaining power between an entire industry, on the one hand, and 
an individual customer or employee, on the other . . . Until today, however, the 
Court has not read § 2 of the FAA as broadly encompassing disputes arising out 
of the employment relationship.302 
When it comes to this Court and this statute (and apparently several Congresses), 
is any Federal Arbitration Act leap too large? In the end, it may be as pointless 
to ask whether private arbitrations over potentially low-impact work stoppages 
has anything to do with broad risks of “industrial strife” as it is to wonder how 
unreported private arbitral awards could possibly remedy the socially deep racial 
and gender injuries that our employment laws were meant to address.  
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The right to engage in work stoppages, so firmly recognized under 
traditional labor law, is likely to encounter stressors and qualifications that were 
unknown and perhaps unknowable to the original architects of labor and 
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employment law. The changes may cause us to rethink the original policy 
rationales behind the original establishment of the right. The initial instinct of 
the common law was to deem employee concerted activities unlawful criminal 
conspiracies.303 To a certain kind of legal mind, the approach possesses the 
appeal of simplicity. That approach was nonetheless abandoned and we need to 
rediscover why.304 
Antitrust law, as applied to non-employee workers, could come perilously 
close to reestablishing much earlier ideas of labor criminality. Work stoppage 
intermittency and compulsory arbitration backed by court injunctions—with its 
organizational-squelching historical parallel under the old labor law regime—
would remove legal protection from work stoppages but not criminalize them. 
Taking a step away from the din, it is hard to ignore the astonishing 
transformation that has occurred. While scholars like Marion Crain and Kenneth 
Matheny rightly press the divide between “business unionism” and “social 
justice unionism,” and contend that “new” labor law is in reality “old” labor 
law305—a proposition that can be easily embraced—foundational legal terrain 
has cataclysmically shifted beneath our feet. The discussion now may not be 
centered on the boundaries or vision of the labor movement, but rather on 
whether any worker anywhere will possess any right following the onslaught on 
the employee definition (and its antitrust implications) and the march of the 
Federal Arbitration Act through the employment statute book. As a lawyer, one 




 303. See Edwin E. Witte, Early American Labor Cases, 35 YALE L.J. 825, 826, 832 (1926). 
 304. See Michael C. Duff, The Cowboy Code Meets the Smash Mouth Truth: Meditations on 
Worker Incivility, 117 W. VA. L. REV. 961, 971 (2015) (discussing labor rights as a matter of worker 
self-defense). 
 305. Marion Crain & Kenneth Matheny, The ‘New’ Labor Regime, 126 YALE L.J. F. 478, 478–
79 (2017). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
168 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 65:115 
 
